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SELECTED OIL AND GAS DECISIONS
Upstream – Federal
Fifth Circuit
Guilbeau v. Hess Corp., 854 F.3d 310 (5th Cir. 2017).
Landowner purchased property on which—more than three decades
earlier—Operator had conducted oil and gas operations. Operator had
plugged and abandoned its wells in 1973 after its oil and gas leases expired.
Landowner sued Operator, alleging damages based on contamination from
the on-tract drilling activities. Operator moved for summary judgment.
Applying Louisiana law, the district court granted Operator’s motion,
reasoning that the subsequent-purchaser rule barred Landowner’s claims.
Landowner appealed and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. In
Louisiana, the subsequent-purchaser rule provides that a landowner may not
recover from a third party for damage inflicted on a tract before
landowner’s purchase unless a predecessor assigned such right to the
landowner—in other words, it is a personal right. And though the Louisiana
Supreme Court had not addressed the question, decisions from the state
courts of appeals revealed a “consensus supporting the application of the
subsequent purchaser doctrine to cases involving mineral leases.” Citing
these decisions, the court held that the subsequent-purchaser rule barred
Landowner’s claims against Operator.
T D X Energy, L.L.C. v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., 857 F.3d 253 (5th Cir.
2017).
Unit Operator (“Operator”) force pooled a unit with several lease owners to
effectively develop the area. One Unit Lessee (“Lessee”) acquired its leases
from the mineral owners after Operator spudded the well, but prior to
completion. Lessee requested an accounting, which Operator failed to send,
while Operator requested Lessee pay its share of drilling costs and risk
charge associated with operations. State statute required that Operator send
all unleased interest holders an accounting upon request. Operator
contended that Lessee did not meet this definition, while Lessee contends
that because its lease occurred after Operator began spudding the well, the
statue applied to Lessee. Because Operator failed to send timely reports
pursuant to state statute, it forfeited its rights to collect contribution of
drilling costs from Lessee. Operator additionally alleged that state statute
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required Lessee to pay a risk charge on the well. However, the statute
required Operator to send notice of drilling prior to commencement of
drilling to be able to collect a risk charge. Because of Operator’s untimely
notice, Lessee owes neither drilling costs nor a risk charge to Operator.
Sixth Circuit
Atlas Noble, LLC v. Krizman Enters., No. 15–4385, 2017 WL 2260988 (6th
Cir. May 23, 2017).
Buyer executed a purchase and sale agreement (“PSA”) with Seller
respecting certain oil and gas leases. On closing day, Buyer notified Seller
via email that Buyer was unilaterally terminating the agreement, alleging
that Seller had not cleared title on a sufficient percentage of the subject
acreage. After receiving Buyer’s email, Seller took no further action on the
PSA and refused to release certain escrowed funds. Buyer sued Seller,
arguing that Seller breached by refusing to authorize the release of
escrowed funds to Buyer per a provision of the PSA. Seller counterclaimed
that it was entitled to the funds, arguing that Buyer had breached. The
district court granted summary judgment for Seller, reasoning that Buyer
anticipatorily breached with its closing-date email. But the district court
denied Seller’s request for damages amounting to the PSA’s total value,
reasoning that the parties intended the escrow account to act as a liquidated
damages clause. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part and
affirmed in part. First, the court reversed the district court’s conclusion that
Buyer anticipatorily breached because at least some evidence suggested that
Seller could not have completed the transaction on time—in other words,
fact issues remained and precluded summary judgment. Second, the court
affirmed the liquidated damages ruling because: (1) the escrow percentage
was not unreasonably large relative to the PSA’s value and (2) liquidated
damages in a PSA for oil and gas leases are reasonable given the regular
fluctuation in lease value.
Eight Circuit
Hill v. Sw. Energy Co., 858 F.3d 481 (8th Cir. 2017).
Landowners sued Producers engaged in hydraulic fracturing operations,
alleging that Producer’s fracking waste disposed near Landowners’
property migrated into the subsurface after refusing to lease property to
Producer. Landowners asserted theories of trespass and unjust enrichment.
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The trial court granted Producer’s summary judgment motion at the end of
the first discovery phase on the issue of whether the waste fluid migrated to
the subsurface strata of Landowners’ property. Although the evidence
gathered at the end of this discovery phase on the issue of subsurface
migration “seems likely,” trial court granted Producer’s motion because it
concluded that a reasonable juror would have to speculate to conclude that a
trespass by migration actually occurred. Landowners appealed. The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the expert report estimating how far
injected fracking waste had spread was admissible in Landowners’ lawsuit.
Additionally, an issue of material fact existed as to whether there were
sealing formations in the property’s subsurface that would otherwise
prevent Producer’s fracking waste from migrating. Given this, the court
reversed and remanded the case.
Tenth Circuit
Fletcher v. United States, 854 F.3d 1201 (10th Cir. 2017).
A certified class of Osage tribal members in Oklahoma brought a class
action suit against the federal government, claiming a mismanagement of
the oil ad gas royalty funds that the federal government was to hold in trust
for the Osage people. The Osage members were seeking an accounting,
which the trial court granted on a limited basis. The Osage members
appealed, claiming that they had the right to receive an accounting of funds
since 1906 and that they should receive a full audit of the funds since that
time. The appellate court affirmed the lower court’s decision, citing one
major reason for limiting the audit as the funds in question were not worth
very much. About $15 per member of the class per year. For this reason, the
appellate court agreed with the 2002 starting point for the audit and the
limited information that was required to be provided.
D. Wyoming
Kaiser–Francis Oil Co. v. Noble Casing Inc., No. 2:16–CV–00309, 2017
WL 1947506 (D. Wyo. May 10, 2017).
Operator sued Casing Company—who supplied casing crews and power
casing tongs at Operator’s wellsite—for negligence and breach of contract
after Operator detected a leak in the casing of its well during a hydraulic
fracturing operation. Operator alleged that such leak caused all fracturing
operations to cease and that Operator incurred damages exceeding $1.5
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million. Casing Company counterclaimed that Operator assumed all
liability for Casing Company and agreed to defend and hold harmless
Casing Company under the parties’ Master Service Agreement (“MSA”).
Operator moved to dismiss, arguing that the indemnitee provision was void
as against public policy based on a Wyoming statute that prohibited all
agreements “pertaining to any well for oil, gas or water” that purport “to
relieve the indemnitee from loss or liability for his own negligence.” The
district court concluded that MSA’s indemnitee provision was void and
unenforceable to the extent it indemnified Casing Company for its own
direct conduct because the activities that led to Operator’s claims were
“closely related to oil well drilling.” Moreover, to construe MSA as
requiring Operator to defend Casing Company would render certain
provisions of MSA meaningless. Thus, the court granted Operator’s motion
to dismiss Casing Company’s counterclaim and denied Casing Company’s
motion for summary judgment.
M.D. Florida
Nat. Res. Def. Council v. Nat’l Park Serv., Case No: 2:16-cv-585-FtM99CM, 2017 WL 1438238 (M.D. Fla. April 24, 2017).
Mineral Interest Owners (“MIOs”) owned interest found within a national
park. MIOs hired an E&P Company to conduct seismic on some land above
the mineral interest. In accordance with federal law, E&P Company filed an
application to the National Park Service (“NPS”) to conduct seismic on
over 400 square miles of the total mineral interest within the national park,
but later changed it to 110 square miles. After much back and forth, two
unrequired notice and comment periods and conferencing with the Fish and
Wildlife Service (“FWS”) about both the environmental assessment (“EA”)
and biological assessment (“BA”), the final plan was approved, a Finding
of No Significant Impact (“FONSI”) was issued and forty-seven mitigation
measures were implemented. Environmental Groups sued NPS and others
for declaratory and both temporary and permanent injunctive relief under
the Administrative Procedures Act (“APA”), the National Environmental
Policy Act (“NEPA”) and the Endangered Species Act (“ESA”).
Environmental Groups had eight claims against NPS arising from NEPA,
APA, and ESA requirements for failure to: (1) prepare an environmental
impact statement, (2) take a “hard look” at the effectiveness of the
mitigation measures, (3) to take a “hard look” at the adverse impacts caused
by conducting seismic, (4) consider all reasonable alternatives, (5) obtain
technologically feasible alternatives, their costs and environmental impact,
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(6) follow consultation requirements with E&P Company throughout the
process, (7) reinitiate consultation after changes in the plan and (8)
reinitiate consultation on the Preserve Management Plans as a new
endangered species had been added to the list since last consolation.
Ultimately the district court found that NPS did follow the requirements
under NEPA, APA, and ESA as required and denied both the declaratory
and injunctive relief. Environmental Groups have since appealed, but there
is no decision from the higher court.
N.D. Illinois
Buchanan Energy (N), LLC v. Lake Bluff Holdings, LLC, No. 15 CV 3851,
2017 WL 1232973 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 4, 2017).
Two energy companies entered into a lease agreement which contained an
option to purchase the leased premises during the term of the lease. The
purchase price was to be the average of three appraisal values done on the
premises. The valuations of the land were vastly different. The purchasing
company’s appraiser valued the land at $295,000, the mutually agreed
appraiser valued the land at $493,100, and the selling company’s appraiser
valued the land at $695,000. Both the purchasing company and the selling
company sought to have the other’s appraisal voided. The court ruled that,
because the average of two appraisals that were done by the companies
averaged very closely to the mutual appraisal, the court could not equitably
strike one or the other, allowing a windfall to the other party. Thus the court
denied the motions to exclude the expert’s evaluation.
N.D. West Virginia
Bison Res. Corp. v. Antero Res. Corp., No. 1:16CV107, 2017 WL 1164500
(N.D. W.Va. 2017).
A resources corporation (“Corporation A”) purchased from another
resources corporation (“Corporation B”) oil and gas leases that Corporation
B owned. In those leases was a right of first refusal to drill, which
Corporation B acquired through the acquisition of a third company that held
the right of first refusal. Corporation A, without giving notice to
Corporation B, began drilling and producing natural gas from the leases on
which Corporation B held the right of first refusal. Corporation B brought
suit and the Corporation A filed a motion for summary judgment.
Corporation A argued that the right of first refusal that Corporation B held
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was invalidated under two different theories. The first was that the right of
first refusal was nontransferable and thus, when Corporation B received the
rights, they expired. The court dismissed this claim as Corporation B did
not purchase the rights, but rather, purchased the third company that held
them. This was not a transfer but an assumption, so the rights were still
valid. The second argument was that the rights of first refusal should be
barred by the rule against perpetuities as the right had not been used within
twenty-one years and ten months or a life in being at the time of transfer.
The court dismissed this defense as the right of first refusal is not a property
conveyance and thus not affected by the rule against perpetuities.
Corporation A’s motion for summary judgment was denied.
Reynolds v. Ascent Res. - Marcellus, LLC, No. 1:16CV77, 2017 WL
1959220 (N.D. W.Va. May 11, 2017).
An oil and gas company (“Company”) leased Landowner’s mineral interest.
Following lease execution, Company found from the state regulatory
agency that production already existed on the property, and so the land was
already subject to an oil and gas lease. Company issued a bonus check to
Landowner less the amount of the land subject to the lease already in
existence, which Landowner deposited. Company then partially released
Landowner’s interest and did not pay the additional bonus amount, for
which Landowner sued for breach of contract. The lease contained a
general warranty of title, and Company argued that this exempted its
requirements under the lease, because the Landowners warranty failed.
Landowner countered that the remaining interest could still be produced,
despite the other lease. Genuine issue of fact remains as to the status of title
at the time Company and Landowner executed the lease, and so the court
denied the parties’ mutual motions for summary judgment.
W.D. Oklahoma
McKnight v. Marathon Oil Co., No. CIV-17-00264-R, 2017 WL 1628981
(W.D. Okla. May 1, 2017).
Lessors sued Lessee after learning that Lessee allegedly passed the cost of
making any unprocessed natural gas marketable to Lessors. Lessors sued
under theories of (1) breach of contract, (2) accounting, (3) fraud, (4) unjust
enrichment and (5) breach of state law regarding revenue standards. Lessee
removed case to federal court claiming diversity jurisdiction and then
moved to dismiss the fraud and unjust enrichment claims. The trial court
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approved Lessee’s motion based on several findings. First, Lessors failed to
allege an “indispensable element” of a fraud claim—detrimental reliance.
Second, Lessors failed to allege specific damages caused by Lessee’s fraud
rather than breach of contract, violating the general rule that “a claim for
fraud must be distinct from a claim for breach of contract.” Third, Lessors
incorporating all allegations in the complaint—including breach of oil and
gas leases—in addition seeking an equitable remedy because Lessee
allegedly benefitted from Lessors’ expense and detriment, violated a longstanding state rule that plaintiffs may not pursue an equitable remedy when
an adequate remedy at law is available. The court approved Lessee’s
motion to dismiss.
Upstream – State
Arkansas
Panhandle Oil & Gas, Inc. v. BHP Billiton Petroleum Fayetteville, LLC,
2017 Ark. App. 201, No. CV-16-884, 2017 WL 1277422.
Working Interest Owner (“WIO”) sued Operator for its failure to send well
proposals and failure to properly account for production. The lower court
dismissed all of WIO’s arguments for failure to state a claim on which
relief could be granted. WIO appealed arguing that the court improperly
dismissed these claims as WIO met the burden under state law to state a
claim. State law only required that WIO plead that a valid, enforceable
contract existed and that WIO demonstrate facts sufficient to show a claim
of unjust enrichment. WIO produced two contracts executed by Operator’s
predecessor-in-interest, which met the low burden to establish a validly
executed contract. WIO also provided sufficient well data to meet the
minimum requirement for factual evidence for an unjust enrichment claim.
However, WIO’s claim for an accounting only constituted a remedy and not
a cause of action. The appellate court remanded the contract and unjust
enrichment claim for further proceedings.
Louisiana
Moore v. Chevron USA, 2016-0805 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/25/17); NO. 2016
CA 0805, 2017 WL 2303318.
Landowner purchased land from an oil and gas company (“Company”).
Shortly after, Landowner noticed environmental damage. Landowner took
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some informal steps to cure the harm then, but did not file any legal
proceedings against Company to remedy the environmental defects
Landowner had found. Several years later Landowner sued to compel
Company to remedy the issues with the property. Company claimed that
this was no longer its responsibility to fix as Landowner waited beyond the
statutory year long period to demand remedy of the defect. Landowner
claimed that the yearlong limitation had not yet started tolling as he did not
have sufficient information about the defect to begin the tolling of the yearlong clock. Company counter-claimed that the clock had begun running
when Landowner first brought the informal proceedings to remedy the
defects. The court agreed, ruling in favor of Company, leaving Landowner
with the cost of the defect, court costs, and attorney fees.
Sweet Lake Land & Oil Co. v. Oleum Operating Co., 2016-429 (La. App. 3
Cir. 3/8/17); No. 2016-429, 2017 WL 914767.
Oilfield Owner (“Owner”) sued Operator, Operator’s Successor-in-Interest
(“Successor”), and Operator’s Predecessor-in-Interest (“Predecessor”) for
environmental damages to the property and failure to abide by lease
remediation provisions. The lower court found Predecessor responsible for
the damage and required Predecessor submit a remediation plan to the state
environmental agency. On appeal by Owner, the court found that Operator
violated express lease requirements that gave Operator a six-month window
to begin its remediation plans, which Operator failed to do. In addition, the
court found that Operator’s council violated a motion in limine which
prohibited any discussion of attempts to remediate very close to trial to
protect the integrity of the jury. In addition to these damages, Successor
allowed the old lease to lapse and signed a new lease which contained
express clean-up provisions, with which Successor failed to comply. The
parties all greatly contested the costs of a potential cleanup, therefore the
court remanded in order to properly assess the dollar figure required in
order to sufficiently comply with the lease remediation provisions.
North Dakota
Black Stone Minerals Co. v. Brokaw, 2017 ND 140, 893 N.W.2d 498.
Rival mineral interest owners, a Mineral Company and a Predecessor’s
Heirs (“Heirs”), disputed ownership of the minerals under a tract based on a
district court judgment and successive conveyances overtime. Mineral
Company’s successors initiated a quiet title against Heirs to determine the
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proper ownership of the mineral interest based on the earlier judgment. The
judgment conveyed title to Heirs predecessors in fee simple, but failed to
specify the percentage of interest. Mineral Company contended that the
judgment vested the entire interest in one of Heirs’ predecessors. The North
Dakota Supreme Court held that, per state statute, and property interest that
vested between numerous people vested as tenants in common. Thus, when
one of the Heirs’ predecessors conveyed his whole undivided interest to
Mineral Company, this only conveyed one-half the mineral interest.
Mineral Company then claimed to have adversely possessed the other onehalf, but the court found that adverse possession time period could only
begin for minerals when Mineral Company produced the minerals, which
had not reached the appropriate number of years. Company also included
challenges for laches and good-faith purchaser defenses, but the court
rejected these because these are affirmative defenses under state law and
cannot be used as Mineral Company sought to use them. Finally, Mineral
Company challenged the district court’s refusal to correct the judgment.
The district court may only correct its judgments, but not make substantial
changes to the law of the judgment, as Mineral Company sought it to do.
The court found that Mineral Company’s successor in interest to be record
title owners to half of the mineral interest, and Heirs to be record title
owners to the other half. With this decision, the court affirmed in part and
reversed in part the lower courts decisions and remanded the case.
Ogren v. Sandaker, 2017 ND 105, 893 N.W. 2d 750.
Conveyees of a royalty interest in land brought quiet title action on the
royalty interests arguing the original assignment conveyed “fractional
royalty interest”. The trial court granted summary judgment finding that the
nearly sixty-year-old royalty assignment conveyed a fraction of the royalty
interest. Conveyees appealed trial court decision. The North Dakota
Supreme Court held that the royalty assignment unambiguously conveyed a
“fraction of royalty” and not a “fractional royalty” to the Royalty Interest
Owner’s seven siblings (“Conveyees”). The court reasoned that although
the conveying language was like examples of language that conveyed a
fractional royalty, here, the deed had to be examined as a whole. The
language in the deed’s assignment’s intent clause instructed that
computation of the royalty interest be so that each conveyee receive an
undivided one-eight share of the total royalty, not the total production.
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THR Minerals, LLC v. Robinson, 2017 ND 78, 892 N.W.2d 193.
An oil and gas royalty assignee (“Assignee”) sued Assignor to quiet title to
mineral royalty ownership in certain property. The dispute surrounded
interpretation of a 1942 royalty assignment from Assignor’s predecessor to
Assignee’s predecessor. Assignor’s predecessor owned a one-third interest
in the relevant property. Even so, Assignee argued it was entitled to 6.25
percent (%) of the royalty in the entire property, not just the predecessor’s
one-third share. Ultimately, the trial court agreed with Assignee, granting
summary judgment in Assignee’s favor. Assignor appealed, and the North
Dakota Supreme Court affirmed. The court highlighted the assignment’s
pertinent language: The predecessor granted “all our right [to 6.25 %
royalty of the oil and gas] produced and saved from the hereinafter
described lands.” Assignor seized on the assignment’s use of the word
“our,” reasoning that the predecessor could not grant more interest than it
actually owned. Assignor thus argued that the trial court’s ruling amounted
to a windfall for Assignee. But Assignee—and ultimately the court—argued
that although “our” showed possession of something, it did not demonstrate
how the royalty interest was to be calculated. In siding with the trial court,
the court held that the assignment’s language immediately following the
6.25 % royalty defined “how the . . . royalty was to be calculated” and
unambiguously showed the predecessor’s intent to grant Assignee a
percentage royalty based on minerals produced “from the entire tract of
land described.” Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
Ohio
Greer v. Frye, NO. 14 BE 0032, 2017 WL 2333722 (Ohio Ct. App. May
30, 2017).
Original Owners owned both mineral and surface interest, and retained a
portion of the mineral interest when they conveyed both the remainder of
the mineral interest and full surface interest to a third party. Through a
series of conveyance from third party to another, Landowners claimed both
surface interest and mineral interest. Mineral Interest Owners (“MIOs”)
claimed their mineral interest as heirs of Original Owners. Landowners
published a Notice of Abandonment in January 2011, in the local
newspaper to try and rejoin all outstanding mineral interest to the surface
interest. MIOs filed an Affidavit to Preserve Mineral Interest within sixty
days of the Notice of Abandonment to preserve their interests. Two years
later, Landowners filed a quiet title action under the 1989 Ohio Dormant

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

582

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

Mineral Act (“1998 ODMA”). MIOs answered and requested the action be
viewed under the 2006 Ohio Dormant Mineral Act (“2006 ODMA”). The
trial court found for Landowner in a summary judgment decision under the
1989 ODMA saying that MIOs did not act to preserve their interest within
the 20-year requirement. MIOs appealed on two issues: (1) the trial court
should have not used the 1989 ODMA, but the 2006 ODMA and (2) MIOs
are the rightful owners under the 2006 ODMA. The appellate court found
for MIOs, reversed the trial court’s decision, and granted summary
judgment in favor of MIOs. The court held: (1) the 2006 ODMA did apply
based on case law saying it applied to all claims asserted after 2006 and (2)
MIOs timely filed their claim to preserve under the 2006 ODMA and are
therefore the rightful owners.
Harmon v. Capstone Holding Co., CASE NO. 14 NO 0413, 2017 WL
2438560 (Ohio Ct. App. June 5, 2017).
Original Owner of the property severed the mineral and surface estate by
conveying the surface estate to a third party and retaining the full mineral
estate in the deed. Current Landowners came to own the surface estate
through several conveyances. Original Owner also later conveyed the
mineral estate to the current Mineral Interest Owner (“MIO”). In 2008,
Landowners notified Original Owner of intent to declare the mineral
interest abandoned and received no response, so they filed an affidavit of
abandonment. Four years later, MIO filed an affidavit to preserve its
interest, yet had never been notified by Landowner of affidavit of
abandonment. A year later Landowner filed a quiet title action, which the
trial court held Landowner did not own the mineral interest under either the
1989 and 2006 Ohio Dormant Mineral Act (“ODMA”). The trial court held
that under the 1989 ODMA it would be Landowners’ predecessor in
interest that owned the mineral estate, and under the 2006 ODMA it was the
MIO because it was never provided record notice of intent to abandon.
Landowners appealed and the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s
judgment holding that the 2006 ODMA applied and that given lack of
notice, MIO still owned the mineral interest.
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Oklahoma
Stephens Prod. Co., a Div. of SF Holding Corp. v. Larsen, 2017 OK 36,
394 P.3d 1262.
Production Company filed to exercise eminent domain for underground
natural gas storage easements and surface easements. More than 140
landowners challenged the petition for eminent domain, but eventually, all
but one Landowner in this case settled. This Landowner continued the
litigation and claimed that the amount offered to him was well below what
his land was worth. Production Company argued that it followed the broad
rules of eminent domain by finding a reasonable fair market value at a price
it could have been sold “by a person desirous of selling to a person wishing
to buy.” The lower courts found that the amount given to Landowner was
calculated using general condemnation principles and found in favor of
Production Company. Because the state does not permit special pricing due
to boom or fancy values, the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed the trial
court’s decision of a lower value for the easement in favor of Production
Company.
Pennsylvania
EQT Prod. Co. v. Borough of Jeffeson Hills, No. 1184 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL
2180678 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 18, 2017).
Town appealed court order that reversed the decision of the Town Council
(“Council”) denying the conditional use application of Producers to
construct, operate, and maintain a natural gas production facility on an area
of its property. Council supported its position with Producers’ alleged
failure to satisfy a town Zoning Ordinance, which states: “The use shall not
endanger the public health, safety or welfare nor deteriorate the
environment, as a result of being located on the property where it is
proposed.” On review, appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision
holding that Council erred when it concluded that the conditional use would
constitute a detriment to the public health, safety, and welfare exceeding
that ordinarily to be expected from the proposed use. The court also held
that Town’s evidence does not constitute the required substantial evidence
needed to thwart Producers entitlement to a conditional use as a matter of
right.
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Murphy v. Karnek, 160 A.3d 850 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).
Heirs brought a quiet title action for a declaratory judgment regarding
ownership of oil and gas rights in a parcel of land once owned by
Landowner who died intestate. A family partnership formed by the widow
of one of Landowners’ sons and widow’s son opposed the Heirs’ quiet title
action. Trial court had granted summary judgment, and ordered distribution
of rents and royalties according to each party’s share. All parties appealed.
The primary issue on appeal was whether the trial court correctly concluded
that until Landowner’s death, Landowner’s widow had a life estate and
Landowner held the remainder interest in the oil and gas in the parcel in
dispute. State superior court held that Landowner’s deed that conveyed a
land parcel but excepted and reserved all the parcel’s oil and gas
unambiguously said that the conveyance was made subject to a previous
deed “by which conveyance all the oil and gas rights were conveyed to”
grandmother, did not change or convey the grandmother’s life estate in the
oil and gas of which the grandfather held the remainder interest. Had a right
existed at the time of the conveyance, the deed’s language treated this as an
exception, and grandmother’s life estate existed before the deed in question.
However, because no right existed at the time of conveyance, Landowners’
deed from approximately eighty years prior in which the conveyed land
parcel did not change. Further, grandmother’s will conveyed to specified
daughter the one-third remainder interest in the oil and gas that
grandmother had inherited upon grandfather’s death. The rationale was the
description of the specific lot did not reduce the general devise, and it was
in harmony with grandmother’s general intent to give daughter income and
a place to live to care for the other daughter.
Snyder Bros., Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Utility Comm’n, 157 A.3d 1018 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 2017).
Under Pennsylvania law, a “stripper well”—unlike a “vertical gas well”—
does not pay certain environmental impact fees. In this case, the state
enforcement bureau filed a complaint alleging that a gas producer
(“Producer”) failed to pay impact fees on its wells. The state Public Utility
Commission (“PUC”), relying in part on an ALJ’s recommendation,
concluded that a gas well is a “stripper well” only if its incapable of
producing 90,000 cubic feet of gas per day during every month of the year.
Producer appealed, arguing that the relevant statutory language— “during
any calendar month”—meant any one month of the year, not all months.
The court agreed with Producer, concluding that because a calendar year

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/10

2017]

Recent Case Decisions

585

consists of twelve individual months, the most natural construction of “any”
meant at least “one” month of the year, no matter which one. The court
noted that to apply PUC’s construction of the word would “engraft nonexistent verbiage” into the statute. Producer’s wells were “stripper wells”
because they produced less than 90,000 cubic feet of gas in at least one
month. And the court noted that even if the word “any” was truly
ambiguous, the rule of lenity would apply to resolve the ambiguity in
Producer’s favor. Thus, the court reversed PUC’s imposition of interest and
penalties on Producer.
Texas
Davis v. Mueller, No. 16–0155, 2017 WL 2299316 (Tex. May 26, 2017).
An out-of-state resident conveyed to Landowner her mineral interest in ten
“vaguely described” tracts in the County. The deed contained a Mother
Hubbard clause and a general granting clause, the latter of which stated that
Landowner was to receive “all of the mineral, royalty, and overriding
royalty interest owned by [grantor in the] County.” At the same time,
another out-of-state resident conveyed separate interests in the County to
Landowner using an identical deed. Two decades later, the out-of-state
residents independently deeded these interests to Claimant, who sued
Landowner to quiet title in the mineral interests. The trial court granted
Landowner’s motion for summary judgment without stating the grounds.
The court of appeals reversed, agreeing with Claimant that the deed’s
general granting clause was ambiguous. The Texas Supreme Court reversed
and rendered judgment for Landowner. The court noted that unlike the deed
at issue in an earlier case—J. Hiram Moore, Ltd. v. Greer—the general
grant in this case actually resolved an ambiguity. Moreover, curing the
deficiencies of the deed’s specific grants was “precisely the purpose” of the
general grant language. The court reasoned that the general grant’s
conveyance “could not be clearer.” And because the conveyances to
Landowner preceded those to Claimant, Landowner had superior title.
Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko E&P Onshore, LLC, No. 15-0919, 2017 WL
2200343 (Tex. May 19, 2017).
Operator A owned an oil and gas lease for the mineral estate separated from
but lying under Ranch’s surface estate, and had three current producing
wells located on Ranch’s surface estate. Operator B leased the mineral
estate adjacent to Operator A from State, but the lease did not allow
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Operator B to use State’s surface estate for drilling. Operator B contracted
with Ranch to use its surface estate to drill horizontal wells into Operator
B’s mineral estate. Operator A sued for trespass and tortious interference
arguing that Operator B needed Operator A’s consent as it owned the
mineral estate not Ranch’s consent as it only owned the surface estate. Both
Operators moved for summary judgment on the issue, and the trial court
granted for Operator B. Operator A appealed, and the appellate court
affirmed the trial court holding that Operator B only owned the minerals
within the mineral estate, not the subterranean structures holding the
molecules. Operator A appealed to the Supreme Court of Texas which
affirmed the lower courts holding that: (1) Operator B’s rights are not
greater than that of Ranch’s rights, and thus they fall within the
accommodation doctrine, (2) that any loss of minerals Operator A will
suffer is not sufficient to support trespass claims as it will be limited to only
what is brought up through the drilling process, (3) that allowing Operator
A as mineral estate owner to prevent subsurface and surface use of the land
would greatly alter the accommodation doctrine and (4) the drilling plans of
Operator B did not amount to tortious interference with Operator A’s
operations.
Norhill Energy LLC v. McDaniel, 517 S.W.3d 910 (Tex. App. 2017).
Lessee had taken a lease with a 2-year primary term from Lessor that
allowed the primary term to be extended if there were “drilling or
reworking operations” conducted “in good faith.” Towards the end of the
primary term, Lessee had drilled six non-producing wells, and was planning
on drilling a seventh, but Lessor convinced Lessee to try and use a
submersible pump to remedy the water production, saying he would
consider it “reworking” under the lease. Lessee installed the pump, but no
oil was produced. One month after the original expiration date of the lease,
which was still held by the “reworking” operation of the pump, Lessor and
Lessee executed a new agreement that that Lessee would assign the lease
back to Lessor for $50,000 within thirty days of executing the agreement.
Lessee waited several months, but never received the $50,000 and when
Lessee met with Lessor, Lessor made a statement to the point of he was
trying to get out of the agreement. Lessee sued Lessor for breach of
contract, fraud, money had and received, and promissory estoppel. The jury
found for Lessee on all but the fraud account, but granted Lessee damages
of $50,000 only on the money had and received account. Both parties
motioned for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the trial court
granted in favor of the Lessor such that Lessee received no damages.
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Lessee appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the jury verdict, holding
Lessee should receive the $50,000 on the money had and received account
but not on the breach of contract claim.
Permian Power Tong, Inc. v. Diamondback E&P, LLC, NO. 12-16-00092CV, 2017 WL 2588158 (Tex. App. May 31, 2017).
Operator hired Casing Company to case several wells through a Master
Service Agreement (“MSA”). At one well, after casing was complete,
Operator was unable to continue drilling, and after several attempts to
repair the well and casing, it made the decision to plug and abandon the
well. Operator sued Casing Company for breach of contract and the jury
found for Operator. Operator was granted around: (1) $824,000 in actual
damages, (2) $319,000 in attorneys’ fees for trail, (3) $150,000 in
conditional attorneys’ fees for an intermediate appellate case, (4) $75,000 in
conditional attorneys’ fees for a supreme court case and (5) $3,500 in court
costs. Casing Company appealed and raised five main issues: (1) the lack of
legal and factual evidence to support a jury finding Casing Company’s
breach of the MSA caused the damages, (2) Operator exacerbated its own
damages and failed to mitigate damages, (3) the trial court abused its
discretion in allowing in certain evidence to support damages, (4) jury’s
award for damages are not supported by the evidence and excessive and (5)
the evidence does not support attorneys’ fees for both trial and appellate
work. The appellate court affirmed the trial court on: (1) there being
sufficient evidence to find breach of the MSA, (2) Operator did not
exacerbate own damages and (3) the trial court did not abuse its discretion
in allowing evidence supporting damages claims. The appellate court did
suggest a remittitur for actual damages based on the evidence and reversed
the trial court’s findings on the attorneys’ fees as it found Operator failed to
show segregation of some of the fees. Operator timely filed its Notice of
Formal Acceptance of Suggestion of Remittitur and accepted the slightly
lower actual damages costs. Overall the case was affirmed in part and
reversed and remanded only as to the trial attorneys’ fees.
Reed v. Maltsberger/Storey Ranch, LLC, No. 04–16–00231–CV, 2017 WL
1683717 (Tex. App. May 3, 2017).
Unleased Mineral Owners (“Owners”) sued Lessee, arguing that Owners
were entitled to a greater share of royalty than Lessee had been paying. The
dispute involved a 1942 deed (“Deed”) to which Owners’ predecessor was
the grantee. Deed granted “an undivided one-fourth interest in and to all the
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oil, gas and other minerals in and under and that may be produced” from
certain lands but also stripped the grantee of certain mineral rights, such as
bonus and delay rentals. Owners believed they owned a one-quarter mineral
interest and thus Lessee owed them one-quarter of the existing lease’s
percentage royalty. Lessee counterclaimed, arguing for its part that Owners
were entitled to only a 1/32 fixed royalty. Both parties sought summary
judgment, and the trial court granted Lessee’s motion. The court found that
the Deed conveyed a fixed nonparticipating royalty interest to Owners’
predecessor and thus Lessee was correct in paying the fixed royalty.
Owners appealed. The court of appeals reversed. Drawing on treatises,
Texas Supreme Court cases, and its own precedents, the court concluded
that the Deed’s granting clause contained “traditional hallmarks of mineral
fee ownership.” Moreover, the provision that “stripped” the grantee of other
mineral rights was telling; if the grantor had intended a royalty interest—
rather than a mineral ownership interest—such stripping “would be
redundant” because a royalty interest owner “has no such rights.” Thus, the
court of appeals (1) held that the Deed conveyed to Owners’ predecessor a
one-quarter mineral ownership interest and (2) remanded the case to the
trial court for consideration of Owners’ request for attorney fees.
Texas Outfitters Ltd., LLC v. Nicholson, No. 04-16-00392-CV, 2017 WL
2124494 (Tex. App. May 17, 2017).
Non-executive mineral interest owners (“Owners”) brought action against
executive mineral interest rights and surface owners (“Executives”) for
breach of fiduciary duty by refusing to lease Owners’ mineral interest.
Executives received two offers in one year to lease the interests, but refused
the options to protect the deer breeding business that occupied the surface.
After a failure to come to an agreement for Owners to buy back the
executive rights, Executives sold the executive rights and surface property
to a third party. The executive rights holder has a duty of utmost fair
dealing to Owner that is fiduciary in nature but does not require the same
obligation to place the other party’s interests before its own. This generally
allows the refusal of leases if maintaining the status quo; however, because
Executives’ business on the surface benefitted from the refusal to execute a
lease rather than maintaining the status quo, the refusal is a breach of duty.
The appellate court found sufficient evidence for this decision and held that
Executives breached their duty of utmost fair dealing by refusing to execute
a lease to the benefit of Owners.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/10

2017]

Recent Case Decisions

589

Midstream – Federal
Eighth Circuit
Webb v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 856 F.3d 1150 (8th Cir. 2017).
Servient tenement owners (“Servient Owners”) brought putative class
action against dominate tenement owner, Pipeline Company alleging that
Pipeline Company breached easement contracts (“Easements”) by failing to
reasonably operate, maintain, and repair the pipeline. Servient Owners
sought either rescission of the Easements, the pipeline’s removal or
replacement, or damages. The trial court decertified class action and entered
summary judgment for Pipeline Company and Servient Owners appealed.
The appellate court affirmed the judgment holding that Pipeline Company
did not have duty to repair or maintain pipeline under the Easements with
Servient Owners. Therefore, Pipeline Company had no liability under state
law for breach of Easements where Easements contained no express
contractual provision imposing duties of maintenance or repair. Further,
these duties were not implicit, and Servient Owners did not show any
physical injury to the properties, even if Pipeline Company operated in an
unreasonable manner.
D.C. Circuit
Del. Riverkeeper Network v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 857 F.3d
388 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Pipeline Company filed an application to extend an existing natural gas
pipeline and to build new facilities across multiple states. In cooperation
with federal law, Pipeline Company conducted an environmental
assessment that passed standards but had the requirement of obtaining “all
applicable authorization required under federal law,” including water
quality certifications. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission issued a
certificate approving construction of the project upon the condition of those
certifications. Environmental Group petitioned for review of the approval
due to the lack of water quality certifications and the miscalculation and
misidentification of specially protected wetlands. The D.C. Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the approval was not to be revoked because the condition
approval did not affect any water quality due to the delay on parts of the
project until after proper certification and the misidentification of wetlands
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according to Environmental Group’s proposed standards was not enough be
judged as prejudicial error.
M.D. Pennsylvania
Transcon. Gas Pipe Line Co. v. Permanent Easement for 1.41 Acres, No.
4:17-CV-0570, 2017 WL 2180366 (M.D. Pa. May 18, 2017).
Pipeline Company received a certificate of public conveyance from Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) to construct a pipeline and
various other associated pieces of infrastructure across several states.
Pipeline Company filed the condemnation suit after Landowners desired
unreasonable compensation for the right-of-way. Pursuant to federal law
regarding pipelines, to condemn the easements for its pipeline, Pipeline
Company must show: (1) it received the public conveyance from FERC, (2)
the rights-of-ways to be condemned we necessary for the project and (3) the
Pipeline Company has been unable to obtain rights-of-ways from
Landowners. Company provided sufficient evidence that each of these
factors applied to its pipeline project. Additionally, Landowners failed to
reply to the summary judgement motion, so the court found for Pipeline
Company on procedural and substantive grounds.
Midstream – State
Michigan
Buggs v. Dep’t of Nat. Res., No. 329782, 2017 WL 2131506 (Mich. Ct.
App. May 16, 2017).
Two Landowners sued the Department of Natural Resources (“DNR”),
attempting to compel them to revoke a gas pipeline easement granted to an
oil and gas corporation. While this proceeding was going through an appeal
and remand, Landowners brought an additional suit to compel the DNR to
revoke the easement. This action was based off of, among other things, the
testimony of a man who believed he found two dead Kirkland’s Warblers, a
protected species of bird, by the pipeline. The court stated that before it
issues a writ of mandamus compelling an official or agency to do
something, it must be proven that the action the movant is trying to compel
the agency to make is within the agency’s responsibility and that the
movant has a legal right to demand the action be taken. Here the court did
not find that DNR had a responsibility to revoke the easement. The
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evidence presented was that a layman thought he saw two dead birds that
looked like Warblers but never produced the dead birds. This was not
enough to create a responsibility for DNR to remove the pipeline easement.
The immediate injunctive relief was denied and the prior case seeking the
writ of mandamus will proceed. This case is an unpublished opinion of the
court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing the case
as precedent.
In re Application of Encana Oil & Gas re Garfield 36 Pipeline, No. 329781
& 329909, 2017 WL 2130276 (Mich. Ct. App. May 16, 2017).
Citizens challenged a decision granting permission to Pipeline Company to
build and operate natural gas pipelines due to the insufficient environmental
impact assessments and the failure to study its effects on a certain bird
population in the area. Citizens argued that the environmental assessment
needed to be for the entire surrounding area, not just along the chosen route
of the pipelines. However, the trial court found for Pipeline Company
stating that there were no threatened or endangered species within the
proposed easement and the construction methods to be used will limit
damage to topsoil. The appellate court held that, considering the
environmental impact assessments as well as supplemental information
provided by Citizens, the trial court did not err in its decision in favor of
Pipeline Company. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore,
state court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Pennsylvania
In re Condemnation by Sunoco Pipeline L.P., No. 565 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL
2291693 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 24, 2017).
Pipeline Company condemned certain lands to construct a pipeline, in
accordance with state law, and Homeowners challenged Pipeline
Company’s ability to use condemnation powers among other arguments.
Pipeline Company properly possessed condemnation powers as a public
utility for years prior, following the state utility agency’s showing that
Pipeline Company provides a public service. Homeowners argued that
Pipeline Company built two pipelines, though FERC only approved one
such pipeline, but the court followed state and federal precedent that stated
the commingling of transportation did not impact jurisdiction, and since the
state utility agency approved the intrastate portions, and FERC approved
the interstate, Pipeline Company complied with the law. Because Pipeline

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

592

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

Company possessed the condemnation powers of a public utility because
the project benefited the public in numerous ways, Pipeline Company
properly used state eminent domain powers. Finally, the court denied
Homeowners’ collateral estoppel claim because the case cited by
Homeowners pertained to a different factual situation, and therefore did not
apply.
Utah
Concophillips Co. v. Utah Dep’t of Transp., 2017 UT App 68, No.
20160221-CA, 2017 WL 1422974.
Pipeline Company sued State Agency and general contractor (collectively,
“Government”) for highway construction project alleging that wick drains
installed during construction damaged anti-corrosion coating on pipeline,
asserting claims for breach of contract and negligence. After a jury trial, the
trial court entered judgment in favor of Pipeline Company and Government
appealed. The appellate court affirmed the trial court holding that the
purported expert who performed direct-current-voltage-gradient test on
underground pipeline for purposes of determining if wick drains installed
during highway construction project damaged the anti-corrosion coating,
was not a qualified expert witness. Further, any error in not striking and not
instructing jury to disregard, unsolicited expert opinion offered by fact
witness invited error. Lastly, the cumulative error doctrine did not apply.
Downstream – State
Minnesota
M & G Servs. v. Buffalo Lake Advanced Biofuels, LLC, 895 N.W.2d 277
(Minn. Ct. App. 2017).
Ethanol plant operator (“Operator”) appealed a foreclosure decision based
on a mechanic’s lien filed by industrial contractor (“Contractor”).
Contractor attached the lien to the ethanol plant, as well as the excess
stillage produced as a by-product of the ethanol production process.
Contractor alleges that the stillage constituted an improvement to the
property, as Operator profited from its sale to local livestock feed lots.
Although the ethanol production will inherently create this stillage byproduct, the court compared the removal of stillage to the removal of
medical waste from a hospital: a necessary task, but not one that creates an
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alteration or repair to the real property on which a lien may be applied. In
addition, Contractor cannot lien the material furnished and labor for the
removal of the stillage as these do not fall into the statutory language for a
mechanic’s lien.
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SELECTED WATER DECISIONS
Federal
Fourth Circuit
North Carolina v. Alcoa Power Generating, Inc., 853 F.3d 140 (4th Cir.
2017).
North Carolina (“State”) commenced action against power generation
company (“Company”), claiming that State owns a stretch of river
Company has developed with four hydroelectric dams used to supply power
to a smelting plant. The river would be the property of State if, at the time
of statehood in 1789, the river was navigable. The historical record of such
a small river is scarce, but the stretch of water was “shallow, steep, swiftmoving, rocky.” There was no record of commercial use of the area, and the
common pole boats and flats of the time would have been extremely
difficult to use in such terrain. There are more recent records of further
failed navigation attempts. A river is legally navigable when used “as
highways for commerce, over which trade and travel are or may be
conducted in the customary modes of trade and travel on water.” The
district court found the river to be unnavigable at the time of statehood, and
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed that decision. State also
claims that Company falls into an exception to adverse possession based on
public trust rights. However, there is no solid basis for such an exception,
and in North Carolina, any person vested with real property of record for
thirty years or more, has marketable title. Company had openly acted as the
sole owner of the riverbed for more than fifty years, and the circuit court
affirmed the decision in favor of Company.
Federal Claim
Clear Creek Cmty. Servs. Dist. v. United States, 132 Fed. Cl. 223 (Fed. Cl.
2017).
Water District sued United States claiming breach of water services
contract with Department of Interior’s Bureau of Reclamation (“BOR”),
inverse condemnation, and declaratory relief. United States moved to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, for failure to state a claim,
and for summary judgment. The Federal Claims Court found that: (1) Water
District’s breach of contract claims against BOR were time barred, (2) a
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factual issue remained as to breach of contract regarding water delivery and
(3) the taking claim depriving Water District’s contractual right to receive
up to 15,300 feet of water annually was not actionable because of the
existence of a water services contract reduced to writing. Accordingly, the
court granted United States’ motion for summary judgement in part and
denied in part.
State
Colorado
Select Energy Services, LLC v. K-Low LLC, 2017 CO 43, 394 P.3d 695.
Water Right Owner (“Owner”) had purchased the property and subsequent
water rights from a Previous Owner that had requested a new water rights
decree (“New Decree”). The Original Decree had granted the original
property owner rights to water diverted from farther upstream and rights to
water in a Ditch along the property. In the New Decree the Previous Owner
asked the diversion point to be moved downstream to a pump located on the
property. When Owner bought the property and water rights, it sued
Pipeline Company for trespass for trying to build a water pipeline along the
Ditch. Pipeline Company filed suit in water court and moved for partial
summary judgment on the determination that the New Decree did not grant
Owner the right to divert water from the Ditch. The water court found for
Pipeline Company, and Owner appealed arguing that the New Decree still
granted Owner the right to divert water from the Ditch. The Supreme Court
of Colorado affirmed the water court’s judgment holding that the New
Decree only cited the Ditch as a source not a diversion point, and therefore
Owner could only get water from the Ditch that flowed to the pump as
located in the New Decree.
Florida
Hill v. Suwannee River Water Mgmt. Dist., 217 So. 3d 1100 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 2017).
Landowners sued Water District for recovery for alleged takings by Water
District after Water District drained a reservoir across their land numerous
times. Landowners allege that the draining deprived them of the viable and
beneficial use of their property without compensation. Water District
countered that judicial or quasi-judicial immunized itself from such claims.
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Water District rested its claim on the fact that it acted under contempt
orders issued by the court for Landowners failure to drain the pond
themselves. To meet the judicial standard, Water District must have proven
that: (1) the act take was a “judicial act” and (2) that Water District
possessed jurisdiction to make such a ruling. To meet the quasi-judicial
standard, the claiming party must prove that their action fictionally
compares to that of judges. The court held that the draining of ponds onto
Landowners land does not constitute a part of the judicial process, nor does
it functionally compare to the work of judges. Therefore, the court reversed
and remanded the proceedings.
Kansas
Doce Ltd. P’ship v. Sandridge Expl. & Prod., LLC, No. 16-1045-EFMKGG, 2017 WL 1836977 (D. Kan. May 8, 2017).
Lessor sued Lessee after learning Lessee had been using leased land to
dispose millions of barrels of water produced from its other oil and gas
operations. Lessor alleged that disposing of off-lease water constituted a
breach of contract and trespass. Lessor also asserted theory of unjust
enrichment by disposing off-lease water without the right to do so. After
filing suit, Lessor and Lessee each filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. The court granted Lessee’s summary judgment motion and
dismissed Lessor’s claims after reviewing the Surface Easement on which
both parties relied in asserting their arguments. Taking into consideration:
(1) the facts and outcome of an identical Louisiana case, (2) the custom of
Kansas law that oil and gas leases convey to the operator the right to drill
and operate a disposal well to dispose of on-lease water and (3) the
language in the second paragraph of the Surface Easement; the court
concluded that the only reasonable interpretation granted Lessee an
easement to construct and operate a disposal well to dispose of off-lease
water.
Michigan
Kowalchuk v. City of Jackson, No. 330463, 2017 WL 2262876 (Mich. Ct.
App. May 23, 2017).
Landowners filed suit against the city water supply (“City”) because of
City’s pumping of groundwater which Landowners’ alleged deprived them
of their property rights without just compensation. State water law adopted
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the reasonable use doctrine which allowed a private party to develop the
water beneath its land, so long as the use of the water does not interfere
with another’s right to use the water beneath his or her own land. As long
as City reasonably used the water it produced, then the action of pumping
the water out of the ground did not constitute a taking under state water
law. The court rejected Landowners’ claim that City must condemn the
area vacated by produced ground water, because Landowners do not own
the water beneath their land. Landowners also failed to establish the
numerosity requirement of a class certification and failed to prove that an
actual injury occurred. This is an unpublished opinion of the court;
therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing the opinion as
precedent.
Missouri
Mo.-Am. Water Co.’s Request for Auth. to Implement a Gen. Rate Increase
for Water & Sewer Serv. Provided in Mo. Serv. Areas v. Office of Pub.
Counsel, No. WD 79988, 2017 WL 2333056 (Mo. Ct. App. May 30, 2017).
Utility Company provided, in the state of Missouri, water for hundreds of
thousands of people through nineteen different water systems. Utility
Company wished to consolidate all nineteen systems into three water
districts and set a tariff schedule. The Public Service Commission (“PSC”)
regulates the public utilities, so Utility Company sought permission from
PSC to consolidate the nineteen systems into three districts. The Office of
the Public Counsel and a multitude of other defendants (collectively
“OPC”) fought the consolidation. OPC claimed that the statutory
protections against utility companies overcharging for necessary utilities
prevents Utility Company from consolidating the districts as some citizens
will be forced to pay more for their water that want Utility Company pays.
PSC ruled in favor of Utility Company, holding that the statute in question,
which prevents price gouging from the utility company, does not mandate
that Utility Company charge solely what it pays for water, but rather, that it
not overcharge for the water overall. The consolidation plan does increase
the cost of water for some, but it at the same time decreases the cost of
water for others, resulting in a “wash.” OPC appealed and the appellate
court affirmed PSC’s decision.
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Oregon
Coos Waterkeeper v. Port of Coos Bay Or., 395 P.3d 14 (Or. Ct. App.
2017).
Port sought from the Department of State Lands (“DSL”) a permit to dredge
a portion of a bay to create a new multipurpose slip, marine terminal, and
access channel connecting the bay and slip. Port used a single application to
apply for authorization from the Corps of Engineers under federal law and
DSL under the state’s fill-and-removal law. DSL issued a fill-and-removal
permit to Port, and Environmental Group (“Group”) requested a contested
case hearing. The ALJ issued a proposed order in Port’s favor, and DSL’s
director issued a final order adopting the ALJ’s findings and conclusions.
Group sought review in the state court of appeals, raising two arguments:
(1) that DSL erred by concluding it need not consider the effects of the
proposed terminal’s operation in deciding whether to grant Port’s
application and (2) that DSL erred by concluding that the second of two
phases of Port’s plan did not fall under DSL’s jurisdiction because the
activities would not involve “waters of the state.” As to the first argument,
the court held that the text, context, and legislative history of the relevant
statute counseled that “project” as used in the statute refers to a removal or
fill activity and not—as Group argued—any effects of the development’s
future operation. As to the second argument, the court rejected three ways
in which Group claimed DSL had jurisdiction over the plan’s second phase.
Thus, the court of appeals affirmed DSL’s final order.
Kramer v. Lake Oswego, 395 P.3d 592 (Or. Ct. App. 2017).
Patrons brought action against city and state (collectively, “Government”)
seeking declaratory and injunctive relief relating to public access to a lake
and an adjoining bay for recreational use. The trial court granted
Government’s motion for summary judgment in a dispute centering on a
city ordinance that restricted the access to a lake and an adjoining bay, and
dismissed the action. Patrons appealed, and the appellate court vacated and
remanded the trial court’s judgment. It held that a trial court does not have
to enter a declaratory judgment on whether the lake was a navigable body
of water even though state statute authorized trial court to grant partial
declaratory relief. Further, resolution was possible without issuing a
declaration on the water’s navigability because the dispute centered on
whether the state law preempted the city’s ordinance, not on whether the
lake is considered navigable water. Moreover, even assuming the lake was
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public and that the public-trust doctrine was applicable, Government had no
obligation to provide public access to the lake from city parks. The
rationale: Although the concept of a public trust requires protection of the
public’s right to use navigable waters, it does not carry an obligation to
ensure access to a waterway over adjoining uplands not likewise held in
trust. Finally, appropriate disposition after granting Government’s summary
judgment motion was a declaratory judgment determining parties’ rights
rather than dismissal.
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SELECTED LAND DECISIONS
Agricultural Use
Minnesota
Legatt v. Legatt, No. A16-1255, 2017 WL 1316144 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr.
10, 2017).
One landowner (“CP Landowner”) installed a center pivot irrigation system
on his farm that would cross over onto another landowner’s (“DI
Landowner”) land. DI Landowner installed drip irrigation on his farm that
required pipes to be buried under CP Landowner’s farm. Both landowners
received from the other an easement to allow their irrigation systems to
cross the other’s property. In unrelated litigation between the landowners,
the trial court held that the easements were reciprocal. DI Landowner
appealed that holding, stating that his easement was perpetual, and that CP
Landowner’s easement was set to expire at the end of his lease. The
appellate court held for DI Landowner. Later, CP Landowner brought suit
stating that if it had to remove its center pivot, then DI Landowner should
have to remove its drip irrigation pipes. The trial court ruled for CP
Landowner, again finding them to be reciprocal. On appeal, the court held
that, since the appellate court had already ruled the easements were not
reciprocal years ago, CP Landowner had missed its opportunity to
challenge the ruling. DI Landowner’s pipes did not have to be removed, as
its easement was perpetual. This is an unpublished opinion of the court;
therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing the case as
precedent.
Pennsylvania
Branton v. Nicholas Meet, LLC, 159 A.3d 540 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2017).
Neighbors sued several farms and a slaughterhouse (collectively “Farms”)
for negligence and private nuisance due to the storage and spreading of
food processing waste (“FPW”) on the Farms that caused a malodor at
times. Neighbors claimed the spreading and storing of FPW violated state
law because: (1) Farms were violating the regulations in how they spread
FPW, (2) the spreading of FWP was not a normal agriculture operation and
(3) the building of one of the storage tanks was a substantial change under
state law and Neighbors were within the statute of limitations to file a
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nuisance claim. The trial court found for Farms and granted summary
judgment. The Pennsylvania Superior Court held that state law only
requires Farms to substantially comply with the law, and that Farms did as
they only were cited for minor infractions which were quickly rectified. It
also held that Farms had been spreading FPW or over a year at the point
Neighbors filed their complaint and that spreading FPW is a normal
agriculture operation. Therefore, the appellate court upheld the summary
judgment in favor of Farms being able to continue to spread FPW. The
appellate court did vacate and remand the summary judgment in favor of
Farms 2,400,000 gallon storage tank holding that it was a substantial
change to existing practices as there was no storage tank on that property
beforehand, and that Neighbors filed their nuisance claim within one year
of the storage tank being operational as required by state law. Therefore, the
appellate court remanded the case to the trial court on this issue for further
proceedings.
Easements - Federal
Eight Circuit
Barfield v. Sho-Me Power Electic Coop. LLC, 852 F.3d 795 (8th Cir. 2017).
Landowners sued rural electric cooperative and its subsidiary (collectively
“REC”) for trespass and unjust enrichment stemming from REC’s selling
access capacity on its telecommunication lines for public use. Landowners
argued the selling of access capacity violated the easements REC had, as it
was only given easements for electrical use of actions associated with
electric use. The district court found in favor of Landowners and granted
summary judgment on both trespass and unjust enrichment claims, and a
jury awarded approximately $79 million in damages based on the unjust
enrichment claims. REC appealed arguing that it was within its easement
rights to sell its excess capacity of telecommunication lines. The Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the summary judgment on the trespass
issue, citing state case law that had previously upheld trespass claims when
utility companies had sold excess capacity of communication lines or power
lines that were not within the original scope of the respective easements.
The court overturned the summary judgment on the unjust enrichment
claim, also citing state case law that previously listed four types remedies in
this situation that did not include unjust enrichment. Because the unjust
enrichment claim was overturned, the jury award was also overturned, but

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

602

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

the court held that on remand Landowners could seek an award based on
the trespass claim.
Tenth Circuit
Pub. Serv. Co. of New Mexico v. Barboan, 857 F.3d 1101 (10th Cir. 2017).
A utility company (“Company”) had an easement over two parcels of land
for the right to run electrical lines across the properties. There were
multiple Landowners, one of which was an Indian tribe. While the
easements worked for Company to accomplish its purpose, it wished to
acquire the properties so that it no longer had to go through the process of
receiving easements. Without receiving consent of all Landowners, it had to
go through a condemnation process to acquire the land. The issue was
whether New Mexico held the authority to condemn tribal land. Tribal land
is held by the federal government in trust for the Indian tribes, so if New
Mexico were to condemn this property, it would be condemning land
legally owned by the U.S. Government. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
upheld the district court’s ruling stating that the state did not have the
authority to condemn federally held land.
W.D. Oklahoma
Davilla v. Enable Midstream Partners, L.P., No. CIV–15–1262–M, 2017
WL 1169710 (W.D. Okla. Mar. 28, 2017).
Native American landowners (“Landowners”) sued the owner and operator
of a natural gas transmission pipeline (“Midstream Operator”) for trespass.
Landowners also sought a permanent injunction to require Midstream
Operator to remove certain pipelines from Landowner’s property. The
dispute arose following termination of a term right-of-way in favor of
Midstream Operator’s predecessor. Landowners refused Midstream
Operator’s request to renew the right-of-way, and the Department of
Interior’s Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) determined that it lacked
authority to grant the right-of-way without Landowners’ consent.
Undeterred, Midstream Operator continued using the natural gas pipeline.
The district court granted Landowners’ motion for summary judgment on
both claims. First, the court concluded that obtaining consent forms from
various tenants-in-common to Landowners’ property failed to satisfy the
requirements of a federal statute governing easements across Indian trust
lands. That statute required consent from owners of a majority of the
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interests in a tract, and any defense based on state law did not apply to the
case. Second, the court concluded that a permanent injunction was proper.
Even though BIA advised Midstream Operator’s predecessor that it should
remove the pipeline if the right-of-way was not renewed, Midstream
Operator did nothing to move the pipeline when its negotiations with
Landowners failed. Moreover, Midstream Operator’s continuing trespass on
Landowner’s property was clearly intentional. This case has since been
appealed but there is no final decision from the higher court as of
publication.
Easements – State
California
Hinrichs v. Melton, 218 Cal. Rptr. 3d 13 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
Landowner A inherited two parcels of property that were connected, and
parcel 1 had to be crossed to access parcel 2. Landowner A inherited the
properties while he was living away from the land, and decided to sell
parcel 1 to Landowner B. Once parcel 1 was transferred to Landowner B
parcel 2 was completely landlocked. Landowner A later tried to get an
easement on parcel 1 from Landowner B to access parcel 2, but Landowner
B refused. This suit then commenced with Landowner A asking the court to
grant an equitable easement. Landowner B’s reasoning for not giving
Landowner A the easement is that it was Landowner A who landlocked his
property and, for that reason, he should face the implications of his actions.
The court found in favor of Landowner A, granting the easement, finding
that the actions of Landowner A, land-locking his own property, did not bar
him from receiving an equitable easement.
Connecticut
Thurlow v. Hulten, 173 Conn. App. 694 (2017).
Landowner and Neighbor disputed whether easements for Landowner
existed over Neighbor’s property. In the trial court, Landowner argued that
Neighbor interfered with Landowner’s right to access its landlocked
property via easements over Neighbor’s property. Neighbor’s property
contained two adjacent lots. As to the first, Landowner claimed an express
easement. As to the second, Landowner claimed an easement by necessity
or an easement by implication. For its part, Neighbor argued that
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Landowner had been trespassing and sought to quiet title to the disputed
property. Neighbor claimed that any easement—if one existed—was
limited to the first lot. Neighbor also sought to enjoin Landowner’s use of
the second lot to access its property. The trial court rejected Landowner’s
claim, concluding that it had no easement over Neighbor’s second lot
because it could not prove necessity and could not prove intent on the part
of Neighbor or its predecessor. Further, and among other relief, the court
denied Landowner’s request for injunction to prevent Neighbor from
blocking access to the second lot. Both parties appealed. The court of
appeals summarily affirmed the judgment of the trial court, simply adopting
the “thorough and well-reasoned decision” as its own.
Indiana
Hochgesang v. McLain, No. 13A01-1608-PL-1944, 2017 WL 2492577
(Ind. Ct. App. June 9, 2017).
Landowner appealed trial court conclusion that it failed to establish the
existence of a prescriptive easement by clear and convincing evidence
alone. Landowner appealed raising the sole issue of whether trial court
committed error in its judgment. The appellate court affirmed the lower
court’s decision because Landowner could not establish intent. This
jurisdiction’s case law generally disfavors prescriptive easements such that
a party claiming one must meet stringent requirements including: (1)
control, (2) intent, (3) notice and (4) duration. Based on the record,
appellate court found that Landowner did not meet its evidentiary burden
and as such the court could not find that the trial court erred in its judgment.
Further, the appellate court declined to give more weight to certain
evidence in the record as such tasks remains with the trial court. This is an
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be
consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Michigan
Twp. of Lockport v. City of Three Rivers, No. 331711, 2017 WL 1927859
(Mich. Ct. App. May 9, 2017).
City purchased land from private landowners through which Township
owned an easement for its underground water-transmission line. City later
approved a resolution to annex the land. Township objected and sued City
to prevent the annexation. The trial court entered a temporary restraining
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order but ultimately (1) denied Township’s motion for preliminary
injunction and (2) granted summary judgment for City. The trial court
reasoned that City could annex the land because it was “vacant” within the
meaning of the relevant state statute. Township appealed, and the court of
appeals reversed. The court noted that although the statute does not define
the word “vacant,” the court’s cases—relying on the word’s plain
meaning—had interpreted the word as referring to land that is “not put to
use.” Here, neither party disputed that Township “currently and constantly”
used the land for its water transmission line. Thus, the land was not
“vacant” for purposes of the statute. Had Township’s use of the land been
merely temporary or seasonal, the court’s precedents might have required a
different outcome, but those were “simply not the facts” at issue. Moreover,
and contrary to City’s arguments, the court stated that the statute’s use of
the word “property” clearly contemplated “the space below the surface” of
the land. The court thus remanded to the trial court for entry of an order of
summary judgment in Township’s favor.
Minnesota
Doran Dev., LLC v. Se. Props., Inc., A16-1091, 2017 WL 2062055 (Minn.
Ct. App. May 15, 2017).
Development Company filed suit against two Property Owners (“Owner 1”
and “Owner 2”) to enforce a right to easements contained in a Purchase
Agreement between the parties. Owner 2 filed counterclaims against
Development Company and Owner 1. Owner 1 and Development Company
stipulated a dismissal of claims between them, and Development Company
and Owner 2 entered into an unwritten Settlement Agreement.
Development Company later informed Owner 2 that it no longer wished to
abide by the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Because no writing existed
to finalize the Settlement Agreement, it failed to satisfy the statue of frauds.
It also failed to rise to the level of partial performance or promissory
estoppel against Development Company. Owner 2 also asserted that the
access easement granted to Owner 1 constituted a breach of the Purchase
Agreement. Although the easement differed slightly from the terms of the
Purchase Agreement, the differences did not rise to the level of a breach of
the agreement because the variances still fit within the catchall provisions
of the easement portions of the Purchase Agreement. Finally, the court
denied Owner 2’s argument that the easement be disregarded under the
doctrine of contemporaneous transaction. This opinion is an unpublished

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

606

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules should be consulted before
citing the case as precedent.
North Carolina
Mills v. Majette, No. COA16-1145, 2017 WL 2118723 (N.C. Ct. App. May
16, 2017).
Homeowners’ property was setback from the road, and thus they were
granted an easement across the strip of land to the road. Homeowners’ used
the easements regularly and even built two different driveways across the
land. Property Owners owned the strip of land, approximately ten acres
behind Homeowners’ property, and other nearby lands. State cited Property
Owners for deficiencies in their lands needing repair, and included
Homeowners’, both of whom eventually settled with State. In making the
necessary repairs, Property Owners damaged and blocked Homeowners’
easements. Homeowners’ and one Property Owner reached a settlement
agreement (“Agreement”), which the court approved, and Property Owner
began to follow through on. Then two Property Owners no longer agreed
the issue had been settled and filed a motion for summary judgment arguing
that: (1) there was no meeting of the minds to create an official contract and
(2) that the one Property Owner did not have the authority to bind the other
two. The trial court found for the Homeowners’ and granted their motion to
enforce the Agreement, which the two Property Owners appealed. The
appellate court held that: (1) there was an adequate evidence to prove there
was a meeting of the minds and (2) that there was not adequate evidence to
prove that the one Property Owner had the power to bind the other two
Property Owners’ besides his familial relationship with them. The court
ultimately affirmed the trial court in part and reversed and remanded in
part. This case is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court
rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Oregon
Lenn v. Lane Cty., 285 Or. App 520 (Or. Ct. App. 2017).
Property Owner land was burdened by an easement for Neighbor to access
its property. County amended its easement width requirements, requiring
them to be wider, and then Neighbor partitioned to separate out almost two
acres of its property. County approved the partitioning and grandfathered in
the original easement to stay at its original width. Property Owners sued
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arguing the petition should not have been granted because it cancelled out
the current grandfathered easement that is narrower than required. Both
County and the trial court affirmed the interpretation that even with the
partitioning of the property the easement remained grandfathered in under
the narrower width. On appeal Property Owner argued its original argument
that the partition should not be allowed because there would no longer be a
legal easement to Neighbor’s property and that the easement should not be
grandfathered in because there are other access points to Neighbor’s
property. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s finding that the
easement was not destroyed and dismissed the argument on other access
points as Property Owner did not raise the issue at the county or trial court
level.
Washington
Kave v. McIntosh Ridge Primary Rd. Ass’n, 394 P.3d 446 (Wash. Ct. App.
2017).
A residential community (“Community”) brought suit against a Landowner,
trying to quiet title in easements across Landowner’s property. When
Landowner purchased his property from the community, it was burdened by
several easements across the property. However, the trails that were used to
cross Landowner’s property did not cross the land that was covered by the
easements. It was for this reason that Landowner tore down some fences
and benches, as they were on parts of his property not burdened by the
easements. Community sued, asking the court to alter the easement so that
it covered the land currently being used as a trail rather than the land that
was actually burdened by the easement. The trial court found in favor of
Community and granted the request as well as fees of $237,000. Landowner
appealed and the appellate court reversed, stating that the trial court did not
have the authority to alter the easement in this manner.
Wyoming
Whaley v. Flitner Ltd. P’ship, 2017 WY 59, 395 P.3d 653 (Wyo. 2017).
Landowners appealed the decision which created a new access road for
numerous parties, but created an easement across Landowners’ property in
perpetuity. Landowners desired the creation of a new access road, as
climate and upkeep limited access via existing roads. Landowners argued
that the state private road statue required the review board (“Board”) to
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locate the road along the route as included in the proposal by Landowners.
Although the road must follow the general path of the proposal, because of
notice requirements to affected landowners, Board may alter the exact route
of the road beyond the exact bounds of the proposal. Landowners also
argued that Board’s determination of the most convenient route violated
case law and was illogical based on the evidence presented. The Wyoming
Supreme Court found that the case law cited by Landowners did not compel
Board to abide by Landowners’ choice, and the evidence did not render
Board’s decision illogical.
Other Land Issues – Federal
Sixth Circuit
Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Jones, No. 16–6342, 2017 WL 1969488 (6th Cir. May
12, 2017).
Tennessee Valley Authority (“TVA”) sued Landowner for trespass and
violation of the federal Tennessee Valley Authority Act (“Act”). In 1939,
TVA acquired a certain strip of land along the southern bank of a river.
Some fifty years later, Landowner purchased land away from the bank but
adjacent to TVA’s riverside strip. Landowner sought TVA’s permission to
build private water-use facilities on the river’s edge, but TVA denied the
request. Landowner then acquired a right of way through TVA’s property to
a riverside landing. Believing he owned the landing itself, Landowner again
sought TVA’s permission to build, which TVA again denied. Undeterred,
Landowner spent the next two decades building upon and modifying the
riverside area he regarded as his landing; Landowner built a launch ramp, a
dock, and a boathouse. During that period, TVA consistently warned
Landowner that his structures violated the Act. After TVA sued, the district
court issued a permanent injunction requiring Landowner to remove the
riverside structures. Landowner appealed, and the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed. The court stated that regardless of whether Landowner
actually owned the landing, the Act required him to obtain TVA’s approval
before building the structures. Landowner failed to do so, repeatedly
ignoring TVA’s warnings regarding the Act. Moreover, the court held that
the district court’s permanent injunction was not an abuse of discretion:
among other things, any hardship befalling Landowner was foreseeable
rather than undue because “he chose to build the structures without a permit
at all.” This case is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal
court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
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Federal Circuit
Estate of Hage v. United States, No. 2016-1330, 2017 WL 1406500 (Fed.
Cir. Apr. 20, 2017).
Landowners appealed a ruling denying their ability to bring a claim against
the Federal Government (“Government”), which alleged that Government’s
alleged harassment and threats of prosecution constituted a taking of their
property rights. Landowners’ rest their claim on a previous appellate court’s
remand that ordered “further proceedings consistent with [that] opinions.”
Landowners contended that that phrase allowed them to challenge
Government’s harassment regarding the restriction of their water rights.
Government contended that such previous court rulings precluded such an
argument as already decided. The court found that the previous ruling on
this issue foreclosed Landowners’ ability to challenge Government’s action
as previous appeals rendered judgment on the issue in the favor of
Government. This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal
court rules should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
Federal Claims
Haggart v. United States, 131 Fed. Cl. 628 (Fed. Cl. 2017).
Landowners are two members of a class of landowners (“Class”) that had
filed a class action suit against the Government for an improper taking of
their lands when the government converted the right-of-way held by the
railroad to one used for recreational trails under federal law. After a series
of cases certifying the Class and then breaking it down into smaller Classes,
a final settlement agreement (“Settlement”) was finally approved awarding
the whole Class $110,000,000 plus attorney fees. Landowners objected to
the attorney fees and to the valuation of their property. After a fairness
hearing, the district court approved the Settlement, and Landowners
appealed both the Settlement approval and the attorney fees. Government
supported Landowners’ position that the award should be allocated
differently, but did not appeal itself. The appellate court reversed the
Settlement and required that full disclosure on the method for evaluating
the different properties be disclosed. While the disclosures were made,
there was no discussion on reallocation, and Government changed its
position on the of the property values based on the outcome of a similar
case in another district. After establishing a new procedural schedule,
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Government and Landowners filed for various summary judgments, to
which the Class filed a motion to enforce the Settlement as agreed upon.
The trial court denied Government’s and Landowners’ various summary
judgments finding that: (1) some of the motions were moot and (2)
subsequent changes in the law after a binding Settlement is reached will not
change the Settlement. The trial court granted the Class’s motion to enforce
the judgment as is, with room to reallocate the already awarded amount as
need be.
S.D. Florida
JAWHBS LLC. v. Arevalo, No. 15-CV-24176, 2017 WL 1345141 (S.D. Fla.
Mar. 21, 2017).
Challenger brought a claim of collusion against prior property buyers
(“Buyers”) for their efforts to drive down the price of particular land
pursuant to a bankruptcy sale. Challenger alleges that Buyers conversed
with one another and participated in a scheme to push out other potential
buyers and cut the purchase price to nearly half of the property’s true value.
Buyers sought to dismiss the claims for failure to state a claim. The court
denied the motion as to certain members of Buyers, as their actions
constituted what could reasonably be construed as a violation of federal and
state anti-trust statutes. However, the court dismissed the remainder of
Buyers. The court additionally dismissed the claims for punitive damages,
civil aiding and abetting and tortious interference.
Other land Issues – State
Alabama
SIMA Props., L.L.C. v. Cooper, No. 2160132, 2017 WL 1291130 (Ala. Civ.
App. Apr. 7, 2017).
Operator brought inverse condemnation action against director of state
agency and city (collectively, “Government”) after it closed a driveway
adjacent to a highway. Government moved to dismiss Operator’s suit,
which the trial court granted causing Operator to appeal. The appellate
court reversed and remanded case for several reasons. First, sovereign
immunity did not time bar Operator’s inverse condemnation action; an
exception to sovereign immunity existed for a valid inverse-condemnation
action brought against a government official in its representative capacity.
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Second, Operator’s allegations that by closing driveway Government
interfered with its right of access from highway, which it obtained by its
being an abutting landowner, did in fact state a claim for inverse
condemnation against Government. Although Operator did not own
property situated near closed driveway, this fact did not preclude Operator’s
claim.
Hawaii
City of Kaia’I v. Hanalei River Holdings Ltd., 394 P.3d 741 (Haw. 2017).
County condemned three properties that were next to each other that were
all owned by the same property owner or his business (collectively
“Property Owner”). Based on this condemnation action there were three
main issues that arose throughout the case. The issues were whether: (1) the
trial court could allow County to withdraw money from the compensation
fund (“Fund”) when it was appraised a lower amount than originally
appraised for the properties, (2) Property Owner was entitled to severance
damages for the easement he owned across a neighboring property and (3)
the trial court correctly calculated the interest on the Fund. The appellate
court held that: (1) the trial court could allow County to withdraw from the
Fund, (2) that Property Owner was not entitled to severance damages based
on state and federal common law and (3) that the amount of the interest was
correct, but incorrectly calculated by the trial court. Property Owner
appealed to the Supreme Court of Hawai’i that held: (1) the trial court could
allow County to withdraw from the Fund, (2) Property Owner was not
entitled to severance damages, but for slightly different reasoning than the
trial and appellate courts found, and (3) that the appellate court correctly
calculated the interest on the Fund.
Florida
Mathers v. Wakulla City, No. 1D16–0582, 2017 WL 1655252 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. May 2, 2017).
A dispute arose between adjoining landowners on a dead-end gravel road
(“Road”). Road was the only means of ingress and egress for the residences
it served. Landowner built a fence and gate to block Neighbor from using
Road. After Neighbor proceeded through the gate, Landowner chained it
closed. The county sheriff’s office responded to the dispute. Neighbor
claimed that Road was publicly owned and thus Landowner had no right to
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obstruct Neighbor’s passage; but County declared that Road was private.
Neighbor sued Landowner and County, seeking a declaration that Road was
public property based on statutory dedication. At trial, both Neighbor and
County moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted County’s
motion, reasoning: (1) private parties could not invoke the dedication
statute and (2) dedication did not occur because County did not accept
ownership of Road. The court of appeals reversed in Neighbor’s favor,
holding that acceptance is not an element of statutory-presumed dedication
and that private parties may invoke the statute. Moreover, the court
remanded the case for further proceedings because a fact issue remained
regarding whether County had maintained or repaired Road for the
statutorily-prescribed period.
Sabal Trail Transmission, LLC v. Real Estate, No. 1:16-cv-063-MW-GRJ,
2017 WL 2783995 (N.D. Fla. June 27, 2017).
Landowner owned land that a natural gas company (“Company”) sought to
condemn to use for part of its public utility efforts. Company was trying to
condemn the property under the federal law, the Federal Power Act
(“FPA”). Landowner was seeking to have the land valued under the state
condemnation legislation, the Natural Gas Act (“NGA”). The reason for the
difference was the state of Florida provided a “full compensation”
condemnation valuation for the property, which was more than the value
under FPA. The federal court held that, because this was eminent-domain
condemnation with a private party, Company, taking the land of another
private party, Landowner, state law applies so that Florida’s NGA applied,
rather than FPA, requiring Company to pay full price for the condemnation.
Illinois
Whipple v. Vill. of N. Utica, 2017 IL App (3d) 150547, 2017 WL 1506057.
A Landowner sued the Village of North Utica (“Village”), seeking an
enforcement of zoning laws to keep a mining company (“Company”) from
opening a mine right next to his land. The Landowner claimed that
Company’s operations would be a private nuisance and is seeking
injunctive relief. The lower court dismissed the nuisance claim on a
summary judgement motion, stating that, because the mining operation was
not yet underway, there were no specific damages that Landowner could
base his claim upon to receive the injunctive relief. However, on appeal, the
court held that summary judgment was inappropriate as Landowner could
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provide facts that would support a private nuisance claim. Facts like
Company producing continuous light and noise, constant truck traffic
hauling loads of sand, creation of dust, etc. were enough to deny Village’s
motion for summary judgment, allowing Landowner to bring a claim.
Kentucky
Drakes Creek Holding Co. v. Franklin-Simpson Cty. Bd. of Zoning
Adjustment, 518 S.W.3d 174 (Ky. Ct. App. 2017).
Landowners sought a conditional-use permit (“Permit”) from the local
Board of Zoning Adjustment (“BZA”) to operate a rock quarry on certain
properties. These properties were accessible only by a narrow county road
(“Road”). After a lengthy and hotly-disputed public hearing, BZA granted
Permit because the quarry would “benefit the community by creating jobs
and increasing competition.” Neighbors appealed BZA’s decision to the
trial court. Meanwhile, the local government issued various ordinances, one
of which prohibited commercial trucks from accessing Road. To reach the
quarry, trucks began using a private haul road. In view of the ordinances,
BZA scheduled a hearing and revoked the Permit, reasoning that
Landowners no longer complied with the Permit’s conditions. Landowners
sought review in the trial court, which concluded that the Permit was
properly issued and improperly revoked. The court of appeals affirmed. The
court concluded that BZA had a sufficient basis for issuing Permit as: (1)
the quarry was a proper conditional use for the area’s zoning, (2) the quarry
served the public interest and (3) the Permit did not violate Neighbor’s due
process rights. Moreover, BZA “erroneously concluded” that the ordinances
made it “impossible” to comply with Permit. Though the ordinances made
it difficult to comply with BZA’s conditions, “uncertain commercial
feasibility does not equal impossibility.” Thus, revocation was arbitrary,
and the trial court properly reinstated Permit.
Sw. Clark Neighborhood Ass’n, Inc. v. Branham, NP. 2015-CA-001645MR, 2017 WL 1193184 (Ky. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2017).
Mining Company applied for a zoning change to allow it to mine limestone
on a 103-acre track. The original application was denied by Planning
Commission for various reasons. After acquiring additional land and
changing the mine from a surface mine to an underground mine Mining
Company reapplied for the zoning change. There was then an open hearing
on the application in front of Planning Commission, in which both Mining
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Company and Neighborhood Association which opposed the mine got to
present their sides. Planning Commission recommended the denial of the
amendment, but sent the recommendation to the fiscal court (“CCFC”) for
final decision. CCFC went through the public record from the hearing and
allowed both sides to state their opinions before making the decision to
allow the change in zoning, finding the change appropriate and that the
current zoning was inappropriate. Neighborhood Association appealed to
the trial court that affirmed CCFC findings. Neighborhood Association then
appealed. The appeals court held that CCFC’s finding that the amendment
was appropriate and that the current zoning was inappropriate as it was only
supposed to find one or the other, but otherwise upheld the amendment to
the zoning ordinances in favor of CCFC and Mining Company. This
opinion is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules
should be consulted before citing opinion as precedent.
Louisiana
Duncan Oil, Inc. v. State of La. Mineral & Energy Bd., 2016-988 (La. App.
3 Cir. 4/19/17); 216 So. 3d 861.
In this action, the Louisiana State Mineral and Energy Board (“State”)
sought to recover land from an oil and gas company (“Company”) and the
tract’s current owners, another oil and gas company and individual
landowner (“Owners”). Company had acquired the land and used it for oil
and gas exploration until Owners acquired the land through a 1983
redemption and 1984 tax sale. The land Owners purchased was described
by both an acreage amount and in legal description. The challenge comes
from State, saying that the land purchased by the owners is far less than the
acreage amount put in the description. The legal description of the property
only conveyed a small fraction of the acreage described, the acreage that
Owners thought they had purchased. The court looked at the claims by
State and granted Owners’ request for summary judgment, in large part,
because State was collecting taxes from Owners as if they were the owners
of the whole acreage listed in the description, rather than just the legal
description acres.
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Michigan
Bugai v. Ward Lake Energy, No. 331551, 2017 WL 1337476 (Mich. Ct.
App. Apr. 11, 2017).
Snowmobiler suffered injuries after being ejected from his snowmobile
while crossing Operator’s well-site access road. Notably, Snowmobiler did
not pay Operator a fee to ride on the property. Snowmobiler sued Operator
for his injuries, alleging that Operator breached a duty owed to riders by
failing to properly maintain the road or warn riders of danger. Operator
moved for summary judgment, arguing that the state’s Recreational Land
Use Act (“RUA”) barred Snowmobiler’s claim; RUA protects landowners
from liability for injuries suffered by nonpaying recreational users of land.
The trial court denied the motion, finding that RUA applied only to land “in
its natural state” and that the plowed road and resultant snowbanks were
manmade. The court of appeals reversed in Operator’s favor. The court
began by noting that RUA applied because the Michigan Supreme Court
had overruled the case that the trial court cited for its “natural state” rule
under RUA. Based on the Supreme Court’s ruling, RUA does not limit its
application “to any particular type of land.” Because RUA applied,
Snowmobiler was required to show that his injuries were the result of
Operator’s gross negligence or willful misconduct. In the appellate court’s
view, there was no evidence that Operator was extremely indifferent to
potential rider injuries or intended to cause harm. To the contrary, Operator
plowed and maintained the road, therefore the court reversed the trial
court’s opinion. This is an unpublished opinion by the court; therefore, state
court rules should be consulted before citing the opinion as precedent.
New York
Blanchfield v. Town of Hoosick, 53 N.Y.S.3d 226 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
Landowner operated a dog training and handling business on certain
property. After Landowner’s neighbors complained about noise, the local
Zoning Board of Appeals (“ZBA”) advised Landowner that her activities
violated local land-use laws. To continue operating her business,
Landowner needed to obtain a special-use permit. Landowner sought such
permit before ZBA. ZBA—after public hearings—denied Landowner’s
application, citing the “foreseeable impact of dog noise” on neighbors.
Landowner sought review before the state trial court, which dismissed
Landowner’s petition. The court of appeals reversed, holding that ZBA’s
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determinations lacked sufficient support in the record. The court
highlighted that ZBA identified no specific shortcomings with Landowner’s
noise-mitigation measures and that Landowner “offered scientific
measurement of the noise level” at the public hearing. Because no reliable
evidence rebutted Landowner’s claims, there was nothing in the record to
suggest Landowner failed to meet the land-use law’s conditions. The court
concluded by noting that ZBA simply “bowed to generalized objections”
from Landowner’s neighbors.
In re Eagle Creek Land Res., LLC, 52 N.Y.S.3d 160 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
Hydroelectric Company operated energy producing facilities in Northeast
United States. Hydroelectric Company had received a license from the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) to operate these
facilities. One condition to that license was that Hydroelectric Company
had to maintain a public recreational area on the waterway. Hydroelectric
Company opened a boat launch with a fifteen-car parking lot to be used by
the public, meeting that requirement. Later, Developing Company
purchased all the land around the boat launch and developed a high-end
gated residential community (“Community”). This effectively blocked the
access to the boat launch and parking lot. When Hydroelectric Company
attempted to transfer the FERC license, FERC denied the transfer as
Hydroelectric Company failed to keep open the boat launch for the public
to access. Hydroelectric Company then condemned a portion of the land to
ensure use of the boat launch for the public. Community brought suit and
the trial court awarded it $297,000 for the land as a condemning entity must
pay fair market value of the land that was condemned. Community
appealed, stating that the actual damage caused by the condemnation was
much more, bringing in experts stating that the damage was multiple
millions of dollars as now Community was no longer a private gated
community. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision, finding
no abuse in the lower court’s discretion to disregard the appraisals.
Tomhannock, LLC v. Roustabout Resources, LLC, 51 N.Y.S.3d 671 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2017).
Original Landowner conveyed a deed for almost sixteen acres of land that
contained a ten year option to have three and one-half acres reconvened to
Original Landowner. Through a series of conveyances Current Landowner
held the deed to the property, but refused to reconvey the three and one-half
acres when Original Landowner exercised its option. Original Landowner
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sued for specific performance under the option, and Current Landowner’s
defense was that Original Landowner never recorded the reconveyance
deed. The trial court granted partial summary judgment for Original
Landowner, requiring Current Landowner to sign the reconveyance deed
within 30 days. Current Landowner appealed and the appellate court upheld
the summary judgment.
North Dakota
Goodall v. Monson, 2017 ND 92, 893 N.W.2d 774.
Landowner A and Landowner B entered into a contract to convey land. The
deed was drafted and a receipt was issued officially conveying the land and
evidencing the sale. The deed was drafted with ambiguities on its face
though. Landowner B brought suit, claiming that Landowner A did not own
what he was asserting. Landowner B tried admitting into evidence the
purchase contract and receipt, but under North Dakota law, parol evidence
is generally not admissible to interpret a deed. This was Landowner A’s
defense, stating that the instruments of the sale were not to be admitted. On
appeal, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that when a deed is
ambiguous on its face, the court may use extrinsic evidence to clarify the
unclear. The evidence admitted cannot rebut superior evidence, the deed,
but can clear up any ambiguities the deed has on its face.
Huebner v. Furlinger, 2017 N.D. 145, 896 N.W.2d 258.
Heirs to an estate were seeking to quiet the title of their mineral interests in
a property that they inherited. This required notice to be given to any
potential claimants of the property. Heirs had an attorney conduct research
to find all potential claimants and then proceeded to mail notices to the
claimants that were found. One of the claimant’s address came up without a
zip code, so Heirs applied a zip code to the address prior to the mailing.
After the requisite time, Heirs brought the quiet title action and Claimant
whose address had been altered by applying the zip code to the address
came forward to defend his interest in the mineral rights. Heirs stated that
Claimant should be estopped as he did not come forward when the notice
was mailed out. However, the court held that when dealing with the mineral
interested, Heirs had an obligation to use the mailing address exactly as it
was on the records they received it from. By adding the zip code to
Claimant’s mailing address, the notice was not valid for purposes of
estopping Claimant, therefore, the quiet title action failed.
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Sorenson v. Bakken Invs. LLC, 2017 ND 127, 895 N.W.2d 302.
Landowner A and Landowner B have previously litigated over property,
with the first of three judgments being rendered in 2010. In the 2010 action
Landowner A entered into a settlement agreement without representation by
counsel. This resulted in a quiet title action in favor of Landowner B. There
was no appeal. Landowner B brought another quiet title action in 2012, and
again prevailed. In 2016 Landowner A brought this action requesting that
the court reconsider the judgments rendered in 2010 and 2012. The court
ruled in favor of Landowner B, holding that Landowner A’s decision not to
appeal those decisions then had made them finalized. The Supreme Court of
North Dakota affirmed the lower court judgment upholding Landowner B’s
title in the land.
Oregon
Boardman Acquisition, LLC v. Dep’t of Revenue, 393 P.3d 1147 (Or. 2017).
Taxpayer conveyed property that was previously entitled to the state’s
farmland special assessment (“Assessment”). Where Assessment applies,
land has a reduced value for property-tax purposes. But when the land
becomes disqualified for Assessment, taxes previously avoided are added to
the next property assessment and tax roll. Sometimes an exception applies.
Taxpayer had leased the property for farm purposes. When the lease
expired, Taxpayer requested that the county assessor (“Assessor”)
disqualify the property for Assessment. Even after conveying the property,
Taxpayer agreed to pay taxes previously avoided. Taxpayer later sought a
refund, arguing that an exception applied such that it did not owe the taxes
previously avoided. Assessor denied the refund, and Taxpayer sued the
Department of Revenue (“Department”). The tax court found that the
relevant exception did not apply to the land, and the Oregon Supreme Court
affirmed. The exception at issue applied to land that was: (1) public
property, (2) which the owner had leased and (3) where the reason for
disqualification was termination of the lease. Importantly, the exception
applied only when each of those factors was true “as of the date the
disqualification [was] taken into account on the assessment and tax roll.”
The court agreed with Department that the disqualification was “taken into
account” on the first day of the following year, not the day Taxpayer gave
notice to Assessor. Because none of the exception’s factors were true on the
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day the disqualification was taken into account, Taxpayer was not entitled
to the exception and owed taxes previously avoided.
Tennessee
Thomas v. Thomas, No. W2016-01412-COA-R3-CV, 2017 WL 1404353
(Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 17, 2017).
Transferees appealed trial court’s ruling that sole ownership of property in
dispute belonged to Transferors because of Transferees’ non-payment of
taxes and the applicable theories of prescriptions and unjust enrichment.
This dispute concerned farm property where the deed recites ownership as
one-half to Transferors and one-fourth each to two Transferees. The
appellate court addressed Transferees’ issues, and articulated several
findings. First, although Transferees never paid taxes on property, state law
does not prevent Transferees from defending title once Transferors claim
full ownership right, nor does it prevent Transferees from suing Transferors
for partition of property absent evidence of ouster. Second, trial court erred
in applying state case law because Transferors did not successfully raise
presumption of title by prescription, as Transferors did not show they
possessed and used the land to the exclusion of the Transferees for at least
twenty years. Third, Transferors cannot assert unjust enrichment theory
because their payments for the property and titling of interest in
Transferees’ names over thirty years prior constituted voluntary acts for
which the record did not reflect the Transferors desire to seek
reimbursement in the future. The court reversed and remanded the case to
trial court for it to determine if Transferees can acquire a partition.
Vermont
Davis v. Maxwell, No. 2016–381, 2017 WL 1506426 (Vt. Apr. 24, 2017).
Farmer owned land through which County acquired a right-of-way
(“ROW”). Farmer conveyed most of the property to Landowner but
retained a one-acre lot for a residence. Land surveys indicated that the oneacre lot’s eastern boundary was the western edge of ROW. Landowner
conveyed her property to Neighbor and acquired the one-acre lot from
Farmer. A boundary dispute arose between Landowner and Neighbor when
Neighbor drove farm equipment over what Landowner believed was her
front lawn. Landowner blocked passage by placing boulders in the area.
Neighbor filed a quiet title action against Landowner, and the trial court
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ruled for Neighbor. On appeal, Landowner argued that: (1) she was
presumably the owner of the land to the centerline of ROW and (2) she
acquired title to the disputed area by adverse possession based on her (and
her predecessor’s) use of the area. In rejecting the first argument, the
Vermont Supreme Court held that an earlier deed “unambiguously
established” that the eastern boundary of Landowner’s lot was the western
edge of the ROW. Thus, the “centerline presumption” did not apply
because Landowner’s deed clearly expressed a different intention. And in
rejecting the second argument, the court held that the evidence failed to
demonstrate hostile use and was vague as to duration, scope, and location of
claimed uses. The trial court’s conclusion that Landowner failed to show “a
claim of right to the disputed property for a period of fifteen years” was not
clearly erroneous. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment. This
decision was reached by a three-justice panel of the court, and therefore is
not considered binding precedent within the state.
Washington
Bowers v. Dunn, 198 Wash. App. 1034 (Wash. Ct. App. 2017).
Homeowner appealed trial court order restricting contact between it and its
Neighbors and establishing the parties’ rights and responsibilities regarding
maintenance of a private road on the parties’ property. Appellate court held
that trial court erred in issuing its order for two reasons. First, the court did
not have statutory authority to issue injunctive relief under state law.
Second, although the trial court had equitable authority to issue injunctive
relief, an injunction was not the appropriate remedy as the Neighbors had
adequate remedy available under the State’s anti-harassment provisions.
Further, appellate court held that the trial court erred in applying certain
provisions of the road maintenance order to non-parties. Accordingly, the
appellate court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded to trial court
with instruction to (1) vacate no-contact order and (2) modify the road
maintenance order. This case is an unpublished opinion of the court;
therefore, state court rules should be consulted before citing the case as
precedent.
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Wyoming
AllEnergy Corp. v. Trempealeau County Env’t & Land Use Comm., 2017
WI 52, 375 Wis. 2d 329, 895 N.W.2d 368.
Mining Company sought a permit to mine non-metallic mineral mine for
silica to be used for fracking sand. The county committee (“Committee”)
denied Mining Company’s permit after the Committee conducted a public
hearing and took testimony. The court denied that Committee acted outside
of its jurisdiction, as asserted by Mining Company, because County’s
legislative board created Committee to conduct very specific tasks related
to land use and the environment. Committee and each member that
disapproved of the permit, stayed within the confines of this limited
jurisdiction. Mining Company also incorrectly attempted to apply the state
rules of evidence to the permit review process, and the Wisconsin Supreme
Court found that even if the rules applied, Committee did not go against the
clear weight of evidence to make their decision, nor did Committee rely on
hearsay. The court refused to adopt Mining Company’s proposed standard,
that if a permit seeker met all the required criteria, then the permit should
be granted. Because the court did not adopt a new standard for mining
permits and Committee properly acted within its jurisdiction based on the
evidence, Committee properly denied the permit.
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SELECTED ELECTRICITY DECISIONS
Traditional Generation
First Circuit
AES Puerto Rico, L.P. v. Trujillo-Panisse, 857 F.3d 101 (1st Cir. 2017).
A coal-fired power plant (“Power Plant”) sued Puerto Rican municipalities
(“Municipalities”) to challenge certain ordinances that restricted Power
Plant’s use of ash derived from coal combustion. The dispute arose when
Power Plant delivered ash to certain municipal landfills. After Power Plant
disposed of the ash, Municipalities responded by fining the landfills,
sending various notices, and physically blocking entrances to the landfills.
Power Plant argued that the ordinances violated commonwealth law
because they prohibited activities that the Puerto Rico Environmental
Quality Board (“EQB”) had explicitly authorized. The district court denied
Power Plant’s motion for summary judgment and declined to exercise
jurisdiction over the commonwealth preemption claim. The First Circuit
Court of Appeals vacated and remanded, concluding that EQB resolutions
and permits—which authorized beneficial use and disposal of coal
combustion residuals like ash—preempted Municipalities’ restrictive
ordinances. To reach its conclusion, the court of appeals relied on a recent
Puerto Rico case that noted EQB may exercise its regulatory power in
“expressly preempting the field” regarding use of coal combustion
residuals.
Sixth Circuit
Wilmington Tr. Co. v. AEP Generating Co., 859 F.3d 365 (6th Cir. 2017).
A coal-burning power plant owners’ trustee (“Trustee”) sued power plant
lessees (“Lessees”), raising three claims: (1) that Lessees breached a facility
lease by imposing an impermissible lien, (2) that Lessees breached a
participation agreement through conduct that adversely affected the
economic useful life of the plant and (3) that Lessees breached the covenant
of good faith and fair dealing. The dispute involved a complicated sale-andleaseback agreement and featured “several interlocking instruments” that
sought to provide “some protection to the plant’s residual value.” The
district court dismissed each of Trustee’s claims and entered judgment in
favor of Lessees. Applying New York law, the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded for further
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proceedings. The court held that the district court misinterpreted the facility
lease by concluding that Lessees’ commitment to install a scrubber at the
plant after lease expiration was not an impermissible lien. Lessees made
such commitment in a modified consent decree after numerous parties filed
suit under the Clean Air Act; Lessees had modified certain power plants
without installing proper pollution controls. Having reversed the first claim
in Trustee’s favor, the court of appeals also reversed the participation
agreement claim. But the court affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the
good faith and fair dealing claim on the grounds that it was duplicative of
the breach of contract claims.
Traditional Generation – State
Arizona
Ariz. Elec. Power Coop., Inc. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 393 P.3d 146 (Ariz.
Ct. App. 2017).
Electric Power Cooperative (“EPC”) sought tax refunds from the Arizona
Department of Revenue (“DOR”) for use taxes EPC had paid on certain
out-of-state purchases of coal and natural gas. After unsuccessful protests
before DOR and the Office of Administrative Hearings, EPC appealed to
the state tax court. The tax court sided with DOR, concluding that EPC’s
out-of-state purchases of coal and natural gas were subject to the use tax.
Undeterred, EPC appealed once more—this time to the state court of
appeals. The court held that EPC’s out-of-state purchases were subject to
the state use tax because EPC clearly “uses and consumes” coal and natural
gas to generate electricity within the meaning of state law. Moreover, the
court held that such purchases were not exempt from the use tax because
EPC’s fuels “do not directly enter into or become an ingredient or
component part of the electricity” as required by the state manufacturedproduct exemption.
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Renewable Generation
D.C. Circuit
Portland Gen. Elec. Co. v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 854 F.3d 692 (D.C.
Cir. 2017).
Wind Farm and Public Utility disputed how much—and by what means—
Public Utility was required to purchase Wind Farm’s power. Resolving the
dispute required analysis of the parties’ power-purchase agreement (“PPA”)
and the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (“PURPA”). Wind Farm
argued that the PPA required Public Utility to purchase all of Wind Farm’s
power and to do so using dynamic transfer services. For its part, Public
Utility argued that the PPA required purchase of Wind Farm’s power based
on day-ahead schedules. Wind Farm filed a complaint with the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”), which concluded that the
PPA—and its PURPA regulations—required Public Utility to accept Wind
Farm’s entire net output. But FERC denied Wind Farms specific request for
dynamic scheduling and Wind Farm’s claims under the Federal Power Act
(“FPA”). Both parties filed petitions for review with the D.C. Circuit Court
of Appeals. First, the court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under
PURPA to review Public Utility’s petition. Second, the court held that
Public Utility did not violate FPA by denying Wind Farm’s dynamic
transfer services while providing those services to Public Utility’s own
power-generation resources. And finally, the court held that Public Utility
did not violate FPA by directing its transmission personnel to deny dynamic
scheduling services to Wind Farm.
Federal Claims Court
Entergy Gulf States, Inc. v. United States, 132 Fed. Cl. 59 (Fed. Cl. 2017).
Utility Companies filed suit claiming Department of Energy (“DOE”)
breached the contract it entered under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, by
failing to collect and dispose of Utility Companies’ spent nuclear fuel
(“SNF”). In one earlier cases the court awarded Utility Companies’ partial
judgment of $42,341,604 in damages for site modification, payroll and
materials loaders, and additional security. In another earlier cases the court
awarded Utility Companies $5, 197,764 for cask loading costs, and
subsequently denied Utility Companies claims for $562,020 in fuel
characterization costs. Utility Companies moved for reconsideration for
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denied claims. In this case, the court found Utility Companies can recover
full award of $562,020 in fuel characterization costs because Utility
Companies incurred fuel characterization costs in non-breach world.
Additionally, because Utility Companies incurred fuel characterization
costs for loading storage casks that did not require expert opinion or
modeling of costs in non-breach world, and Utility Companies would not
have to store SNF in casks had DOE collected and disposed of the SNF.
D.C. District Court
Swecker v. Midland Power Coop., No. 16-1434, 2017 WL 2189496 (D.D.C.
May 17, 2017).
Owners of a wind turbine attempted to bring action against public utility
companies (“Utilities”) for failing to follow regulations and Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) for failing to enforce the regulations.
Owners decided to bring action in a federal district court, but failed to meet
their burden to show the court had personal jurisdiction over Utilities.
Though Utilities may be part of a national federation like most public
utilities, that does not prove ample enough connection to the specific
federal district, so the case against Utilities was dismissed. As for FERC,
the trial court relied on United States’ Supreme Court precedent holding
that “an agency’s decision not to take enforcement action should be
presumed immune from judicial review,” and dismissed this case as well.
Rate Case – Federal
Ninth Circuit
Cal. Pub. Util. Comm’n v. Fed. Energy Regulatory Comm’n, 854 F.3d 1136
(9th Cir. 2017).
During an energy crisis, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(“FERC”) ordered governmental and non-public utilities to pay refunds, but
that order was overthrown in an earlier case. FERC decided to calculate the
refund deficit by investigating net sales and purchases at hourly intervals.
Groups of public utilities (“Groups”) in the state brought claims against the
calculation of refunds, claiming that the refunds must be calculated over the
entire energy crisis period. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that
FERC did not act arbitrarily or capriciously in its calculations of the
refunds, and the refunds ordered by FERC should stand.
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Rate Case – State
Indiana
Citizens Action Coal. of Indiana, Inc. v. N. Ind. Pub. Serv. Co., 76 N.E.3d
144 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017).
Public Service Company (“PSO”) filed a petition for a new rate design with
the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (“IURC”) that was immediately
challenged by several industrial organizations (“Organizations”).
Organizations and PSO soon reached a settlement agreement, and IURC
approved the agreement. A coalition dedicated to protecting ratepayers then
challenged the settlement agreement due to the lack of protection for low
income customers. The rate design did not include a low income payment
assistance plan or the collection and reporting of its customers’ data.
However, the trial court found the rate plan of a fixed charge plus a variable
energy charge with different rates for large and small commercial or
residential customers was sufficient to approve the agreement PSO and
Organizations. The trial court also found that there was no requirement to
create a payment plan for low income customers or to record their data. The
appellate court found sufficient evidence to uphold these claims and
affirmed the decision.
Missouri
Laclede Gas Co. v. Office of the Pub. Counsel, WD 79830, 2017 WL
1149140 (Mo. Ct. App. Mar. 28, 2017).
The Office of Public Counsel (“OPC”), a public organization representing
the rights of utility customers, challenged the administrative ruling of the
state public service commission (“Commission”). Commission held for
natural gas and utility provider (“Provider”) on Provider’s application to
alter its surcharges associated with the cost of infrastructure replacement.
To successfully establish these surcharges to recover infrastructure costs,
state statute dictates that Provider must file a petition with Commission.
OPC challenged the petitions arguing that the requested amount included
costs not yet incurred and that Commission unreasonably granted of the
petition. The court found that state law did not prevent the inclusion of
budgeted costs in the petition for infrastructure spending, and that state law
did not prevent updated amendments of those budgets. As long as
Commission had proper time to review and audit these infrastructure
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spending proposals, the petitions and subsequent amendments and
Commission’s approval thereof did not unreasonably violate state law. OPC
also challenged the ruling on due process grounds, but the court found that
OPC had time to review submissions, and failed to timely audit the
petitions.
Pennsylvania
HIKO Energy, LLC v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm’n, No. 5 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL
2471054 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 8, 2017).
State Utility Commission (“Commission”) issued a civil penalty against an
Electricity Supplier (“Supplier”) for Supplier’s billing actions during the
polar vortex, that exceeded the Supplier’s designated rates. Supplier
countered that the penalty violated the Pennsylvania and United States
Constitutions because of the excessive nature of the penalty, and that
Commission abused its discretion in its calculation method. Supplier
marketed energy to residents through acquisition from third-party
generators, which Supplier then resold to consumers. Supplier solicited
customer contracts in a number of ways, with a variable rate set in each
contract for the first 6 months of the contract. The polar vortex caused a
massive increase in energy prices, which drove up Supplier’s costs;
Supplier in turn decided to raise the prices on its customers above the
variable rate stipulated in the contract. Supplier failed to prove that the
penalty constituted excessive punishment in violation of the state and U.S.
Constitutions, because Supplier had a history of violation and it relied on
settlements rather than litigation evidence to prove the proper amount. The
constitutions only bar fines which unreasonably charged Supplier in clear
excess of the gravity of the offense, which here did not occur. Supplier
deliberately overcharged thousands of customers and so long as each bill
sent to customers constituted its own violation of the contract, then
Commission properly calculated the penalty amount. Supplier intentionally
sought to overcharge customers to cover its own costs and regardless of the
lack of financial hardship of the customers as a result, Supplier still violated
the terms of the contract signed with the customers.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2017

628

Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal

[Vol. 3

Transmission - Federal
D.C. Circuit
Norhill Energy LLC v. McDaniel, 517 S.W.3d 910 (Tex. App. 2017).
Lessee had taken a lease with a 2-year primary term from Lessor that
allowed the primary term to be extended if there were “drilling or
reworking operations” conducted “in good faith.” Towards the end of the
primary term, Lessee had drilled six non-producing wells, and was planning
on drilling a seventh, but Lessor convinced Lessee to try and use a
submersible pump to remedy the water production, saying he would
consider it “reworking” under the lease. Lessee installed the pump, but no
oil was produced. One month after the original expiration date of the lease,
which was still held by the “reworking” operation of the pump, Lessor and
Lessee executed a new agreement that that Lessee would assign the lease
back to Lessor for $50,000 within thirty days of executing the agreement.
Lessee waited several months, but never received the $50,000 and when
Lessee met with Lessor, Lessor made a statement to the point of he was
trying to get out of the agreement. Lessee sued Lessor for breach of
contract, fraud, money had and received, and promissory estoppel. The jury
found for Lessee on all but the fraud account, but granted Lessee damages
of $50,000 only on the money had and received account. Both parties
motioned for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, which the trial court
granted in favor of the Lessor such that Lessee received no damages.
Lessee appealed, and the appellate court affirmed the jury verdict, holding
Lessee should receive the $50,000 on the money had and received account
but not on the breach of contract claim.
Transmission – State
Michigan
City of Coldwater v. Consumers Energy Co., 895 N.W.2d 154 (Mich.
2017).
This is a consolidated case of two similar cases from lower courts. In both
cases the ownership of property changed hands and there was a break in the
electric service between the original owners and New Owners. Also in both
cases, New Owners switched electric service from Utility Company to City.
Utility Company filed suit arguing under state law that it had the right to
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provide service not the local City because it had been the first to provide
electricity to the consumer, which it defined as the property itself. The trial
courts found that the definition of consumer was not the property but the
actual owner of the property, and therefore as there was a break in the
electric service before New Owners turned electricity on, they could use
City as the electric provider instead of Utility Company. Utility Company
appealed, and both the appellate court and the Supreme Court of Michigan
affirmed the trial court.
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SELECTED TECHNOLOGY AND BUSINESS DECISIONS
Merger and Acquisition
Delaware
In re Massey Energy Co. Derivative & Class Action Litig., 160 A.3d 484
(Del. Ch. 2017).
Shareholders of a Mining Company brought a direct and derivative suit
against Mining Company’s Directors (“Directors”) on claims of a breach of
their fiduciary duties following a fatal mine explosion. Shareholders alleged
that Directors conducted business in a deliberate and systematic way as to
avoid safety regulations, leading to the mine explosion. Investigations
showed that those in charge of Mining Company willfully violated state and
federal safety regulations, and a few of Mining Company’s executives
received criminal convictions because of the mine explosion. Mining
Company then went through a merger in which it became a subsidiary of
Successor Company (“Successor”). Shareholders approved the merger, and
following several stays on various actions, the merger became finalized.
Directors moved to dismiss the claims arguing: (1) Shareholders lost
standing following the merger, (2) the suit did not fit into one of the
exceptions and (3) the Shareholders failed to convert their derivative claim
into a class action claim. The two exceptions for the lack of standing would
have required (1) the merger itself be subject to a fraud claim, perpetuated
with the purpose to deprive shareholders of the derivative claim, or (2) the
merger only reorganizes the existing organization. The court found neither
of the exceptions apply to Shareholders suit, and so Successor properly
owns the rights of Shareholders litigation because of Shareholder approval
of the merger.
Other Issues – Federal
Fifth Circuit
In re Deepwater Horizon, 858 F.3d 298 (5th Cir. 2017).
After a settlement agreement to those damaged by a large oil spill in the
Gulf of Mexico (“Claimants”), the federal district court approved multiple
methods of calculating compensation by the Claims Administrator. Annual
Variable Margin Methodology (“AVMM”) and Industry-Specific
Methodologies (“ISM”) were both used to calculate compensation.
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Claimants challenged the methods of calculation. The settlement agreement
is ambiguous in aspects but is clear that the claimant be allowed to choose a
time period within limits from which to calculate compensation. AVMM
allows this choice by Claimants, but ISM allows the Claim Administrator to
pick funds outside of the designated period. Because of the limitations of
the time period, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Claimants were
subject to AVMM, and that ISM did not fall within the plain meaning of the
settlement agreement.
Neiman v. Bulmahn, 854 F.3d 741 (5th Cir. 2017).
Shareholders sued former Operating Company’s Executives (“Executives”)
for fraud claiming Executives has scienter of the poor economic and cash
situation of the Operating Company prior to its bankruptcy as evident by its
misrepresentation of: (1) production from a new well, (2) available funds to
complete a pipeline project and (3) why a newly hired CEO stepped down
before even signing an employment agreement. The district court dismissed
the case with prejudice, and Shareholders appealed. The Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the district court stating that Shareholders failed to
adequately plead facts to support their three claims.
Tenth Circuit
Energy W. Mining Co. v. Estate of Blackburn, 857 F.3d 817 (10th Cir.
2017).
Coal Miner worked in a coal mine for years. In addition to breathing the
dust from a coal mine, he smoked cigarettes for a large part of his life.
Later, Coal Miner became disabled from a lung disease, emphysema. Coal
Miner filed for statutory benefits under the Black Lung Benefits Act
(“Act”). The Act provides statutory benefits to miners who can no longer
work due to lung disorders’ caused by their employment. There is a
rebuttable presumption that the disease is caused by the coal mining, and
Coal Miner’s employer fought to rebut the presumption. Two of three
doctors said that the emphysema was caused by his smoking, not the coal
mine. The third doctor said that the disease was caused by Coal Miner’s
time in the mine. Ultimately the ALJ ruled in favor of Coal Miner, finding
the disease being caused by the work in the mine, granting benefits to the
miner.
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Gaedeke Holdings VII LTD v. Baker, Nos. 16-6004 & 16-6017, 2017 WL
1173608 (10th Cir. Mar. 30, 2017).
Interest Holder sued Developer for misappropriation of trade secrets in the
development of oil and gas interests, among other claims. Interest Holder
moved for a new trial following a positive ruling, and subsequently
appealed the lower verdict award. Developer alleged that Interest Holder
lacked standing to assert the misappropriation claim. Under Oklahoma’s
trade secrets statute, Interest Holder possessed standing to sue under this
claim, even though other parties also possessed standing. Oklahoma
specifically took out the portion of the statute that required that complainant
have ownership of the trade secrets. Because Interest Holder need not
prove ownership of the trade secrets, but merely show an interest therein,
Interest Holder properly possessed standing under Oklahoma law. Interest
Holder, however, could not appeal the second lower verdict, as parties
cannot pick and choose the most favorable verdict in their favor. This is an
unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, federal court rules should be
consulted before citing the opinion as precedent.
D.C. Circuit
AquAlliance v. United States Bureau of Reclamation, 856 F.3d 101 (D.C.
Cir. 2017).
Water Conservation Group (“Group”) petitioned the Bureau of Reclamation
(“Bureau”) to turn over all records of water transfers across northern
California pursuant to a Freedom of Information Act request. Litigation
eventually prompted Bureau to turn over requested information, but Bureau
redacted water well information. Bureau argued that the water well
information fell into a specific exception to the request under federal law.
The exemption allowed for Bureau to withhold “geological and geophysical
data.” Group asserted that water wells do not fall into the category of the
exemption. The court found that well depth and location, the information
redacted, necessarily reveals geological and geophysical data. The court
held the unambiguous language of the exemption under federal law applied
to water wells and Bureau correctly redacted such information.
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S.D. New York
Harry v. Total Gas & Power N. Am., Inc., No. 15-CV-9689 (JGK), 2017
WL 1134851 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2017).
Buyers and sellers (collectively, “Class”) with physical natural gas and
derivative financial natural gas contracts filed a putative class action against
Traders, alleging monopolization and manipulation of natural gas contracts,
and on the commodity futures and options markets. Class sued alleging
violation of the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”), the Sherman Act, and
the Clayton Act. Traders moved to dismiss suit. The trial court held that the
complaint failed to sufficiently allege economic injury because of the
alleged manipulation of monthly index prices of physical natural gas at
regional hubs required for statutory standing to bring class action claims.
The court reached this decision even though allegations included that
Traders manipulated monthly index settlement prices of natural gas at four
regional hubs because the complaint failed to allege specific transactions
made at a fifth hub, where Class’ transactions transpired, had any direct
connection to the monthly index prices at the other four hubs. Alternatively,
had statutory standing existed, motion remained appropriate because the
complaint failed to state class action for manipulation under CEA. Further,
the complaint failed to sufficiently allege antitrust injury required for
Sherman Act monopolization claim. The complaint failed to allege that
Class were participants in the same market directly restrained by Traders’
misconduct. Finally, Class was not efficient enforcer of antitrust laws
required for standing of a putative class action under Sherman Act since it
was indirectly related to the primary violation asserted, and its alleged
damages are at most speculative.
Other Issues - State
California
Hardesty v. State Mining & Geology Bd., 219 Cal. Rptr. 3d 28 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2017).
Surface Miners (“Miners”) sued to challenge findings of the state Mining
and Geology Board (“Board”). Board effectively denied Miners a
“grandfather exemption” from the mining permit requirement under the
state’s Surface Mining and Reclamation Act (“SMRA”). SMRA required
all surface miners to obtain “an approved reclamation plan and approved
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financial assurances to implement the plan.” The state legislature included
in SMRA a grandfather provision to avoid takings claims from “miners
[who] had extant private property rights” upon SMRA’s passage. The trial
court denied Miners’ petition for writ of mandamus, and Miners timely
appealed to the state court of appeals. Miners argued that Board and the
trial court failed to recognize the legal force of Miners’ nineteenth-century
federal mining patents; they argued that such patents “establish a vested
right to surface mine” after the SMRA’s passage. But the court of appeals
concluded that a federal mining patent “has no effect on the application of a
state regulation of mining.” In short, the fact that Miners worked mines on
the property “years ago” did not guarantee that surface mining existed when
the Act took effect—a requirement for the grandfathering of surface mining
rights. Thus, the court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
Louisiana
Vekic v. Popich, 2016-0508 (La. App. 4 Cir. 3/29/17); 215 So.3d 483.
Owner of oyster property sued for a sublease agreement with Buyer for
damaged incurred by the 2010 oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. Before the oil
spill and settlement involving the property, Owner gave a sublease with the
option to purchase the property exercisable with notice in writing at any
time before the end of the lease. When the settlement was reached, both
Owner and Buyer registered as recipients for damages to the property, and
subsequently sued for the proceeds. The trial court found that the parties’
intent was to give Buyer title, and then Buyer would receive the rights to
any settlement proceeds or future damage protection. However, the
appellate court held that the language of the sublease agreement was a
normal lease with the option to purchase that was not exercised. Because
Buyer did not meet the requirements to buy the property, he was not the
leaseholder of record on the day of the oil spill, and the sublease agreement
did not specify anything involving settlement claims, thus Buyer is not
entitled to any settlement proceeds. Accordingly, the appellate court
reversed the trial court’s decision.
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Pennsylvania
Smith ex rel. Smith Butz, LLC v. Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., 1431 C.D. 2016,
2017 WL 1833472 (Pa. Commw. Ct. May 8, 2017).
A company (“Requester”) appealed the decisions of State Records Office’s
(“Office”) determination denying Requester’s request the State
Environmental Agency (“Agency”) for documents related to a Technology
Company’s drilling and use of radioactive tracers under a state right-toknow laws. Technology Company argued that the records were protected or
exempt from the right-to-know law on various exemptions. The appellate
court held that Agency properly denied disclosure on the basis that certain:
(1) requested records were subject to attorney client or work project
privilege, (2) records may jeopardize public safety if disclosed, (3) records
contained trade secrets, (4) records constituted “working papers and notes”
and (5) documents were still under determination by Agency. The appellate
court held that although some documents regarding non-criminal
investigations of Technology Company’s operations were exempt, state law
required that Agency disclose other documents.
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SELECTED ENVIRONMENTAL DECISIONS
Federal
Ninth Circuit
Arizona ex rel. Darwin v. EPA, 852 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 2017).
State, cement kiln owner, and copper smelter owner (collectively,
“Owners”) petitioned the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals for judicial review
of EPA’s Federal Implementation Plan (“FIP”) promulgated under the
Clean Air Act (“CAA”). EPA issued FIP to replace rejected portions of the
State’s Implementation Plan (“SIP”), which listed proposals to reduce
emission and improve air visibility in federal wilderness areas located in the
State. However, after reviewing Owner’s petition, the court found that
Owner’s challenges to FIP were either not ripe for review or lacked merit.
For instance, EPA’s imposition of emissions-control technology called
“selective non-catalytic reduction” to control cement kiln constituted valid
agency rulemaking because EPA considered all expressed factors including
visibility improvement, though not weighing all factors evenly. Further,
EPA’s limit on nitrogen oxides emissions from copper smelters to improve
air visibility in federal wilderness areas intrastate constituted valid
rulemaking even though the emissions did not currently exceed the allowed
limit set by the EPA. The rationale: Because smelters were best available
retrofit technology (“BART”) eligible sources likely to emit over the
prescribed limit, and BART determination centered on a source-by-source
basis rather than pollutant-by-pollutant. EPA’s limit on particulate matter
emissions from copper smelter constituted valid agency rulemaking.
Although EPA determined no additional controls could reduce emissions of
particulate matter, EPA had an obligation to set emission limits for each
source subject to BART. Finally, EPA’s limit on sulfur dioxide emissions
from copper smelter constituted valid rulemaking because EPA relied on
smelter’s own representation of control efficiency rate when imposing limit
from smelter data that showed such limit was feasible to achieve. EPA also
articulated its rationale for its findings.
Defs. of Wildlife v. Zinke, 856 F.3d 1248 (9th Cir. 2017).
Wildlife Protection Group (“Group”) challenged the issuance of a permit by
various Federal Agencies (“Agencies”) in connection with a right-of-way
associated with a solar energy project (“Project”). Group argued that the
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Project threatened the well-being of a desert tortoise and the decisions to
grant the permit arbitrarily and capriciously violated the terms of federal
law. Group argued that Agencies improperly relied on the remedial
measures of the project, and that the threat to the tortoise far outweighed
any value of remedial measures. However, the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals determined that Agencies relied more on the lack of a measurable
threat to the tortoise, so the inclusion of remedial measures by Agencies
was not arbitrary or capricious. The court additionally rejected Group’s
challenge against the project’s placement in proximity to the critical area
might affect the tortoise because the placement would not actual reduce the
critical area, but the land that connects two critical areas. The court finally
rejected the arguments that Agencies requirements for initiation of further
reviews of the project violated federal law. Group failed to prove that any
of the actions of the Agencies rose to the level of arbitrary or capricious to
warrant an injunction against the project.
In re Big Thorne Project, 857 F.3d 968 (9th Cir. 2017).
The United States Forest Service (“USFS”) approved a logging and road
building project (“Project”) in southeast Alaska. Environmental Groups
sued USFS attempting to derail the Project and protect the territory of
specific type of wolf. The district court granted summary judgment for
USFS, and Environmental Groups appealed arguing that USFS violated the
National Forest Management Act (“NFMA”) in approving the Project
because USFS did not make sure that, even with the Project, the forest
could support a sustainable or even viable wolf population. The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court, holding that under
NFMA, USFS need only provide where possible a sustainable wolf
population, which provides USFS flexibility to balance competing uses of
the land. And as USFS balance in favor of jobs and the economy was
reasonable, especially as the forest did not already support a sustainable
wolf population, the court has no authority to overturn USFS’s decision.
D.C. Circuit
Waterkeeper Alliance v. EPA, 853 F.3d 527 (D.C. Cir. 2017).
Environmental Group sought review of the rule issued by EPA regarding an
exception to two federal statutes regarding the requirement to report the
release of large amounts of hazardous material. EPA rule exempted farmers
from the reporting requirement specifically related to the air release of
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animal waste. EPA then walked the exemption back and required that large
animal feeding operations, with hundreds or thousands of animals in
concentrated areas, still report large air releases of waste. Environmental
Group challenged EPA’s ability to issue this rule, specifically arguing that
the rule extended beyond the de minimis power of EPA to create similar
ruling. Environmental Group argued that this rule amounted to an alteration
of the federal statutes, a power which EPA does not possess. Rather than
interpreting a particular area of the statute, as allowed under agency law,
the final rule sets forth unrelated exemptions under the law, exemptions not
prescribed anywhere in the law. Additionally, the exemptions would
deprive Environmental Group, and others, of public information regarding
pollution releases, one of the explicit goals of the federal laws. Because
Environmental Group suffered an injury in fact and the rule goes beyond
the power of EPA, the appellate court vacated the rule.
D. Idaho
Friends of Clearwater v. Probert, No. 3:16–cv–00485–REB, 2017 WL
2367048 (D. Idaho May 31, 2017).
Environmental Group (“Group”) sought to enjoin a proposed Wildfire
Protection Project (“Project”), arguing that the Project’s activities would
cause “irreparable harm to potential wilderness values” in the area. Project
would involve removing numerous trees and building a road to enhance
public safety and protect homes and other structures from wildfires.
Ultimately, the district court denied Group’s motion for preliminary
injunction of Project. The court stated that although the nature of Project’s
activities would impact the area’s natural landscape, Project’s purpose was
“critical” to the community and safety of persons using and living nearby
that region’s national forest. Moreover, there was evidence that the Forest
Service’s approval of Project complied with relevant environmental laws,
including the National Environmental Policy Act. Thus, based on the
present record, Group did not have a likelihood of success on the merits of
its claims as required for issuance of a preliminary injunction. The court
emphasized that this was not a final decision on the merits of the case.
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S.D. West Virginia
Ohio Valley Envtl. Coal., Inc. v. Pruitt, No. 3:15-0271, 2017 WL 1712527
(S.D. W.Va. May 2, 2017).
Environmental Groups challenged EPA’s failure to regulate and enforce
federal water standards law on an uncompliant state. The state did not adopt
standards for its waterways, as required by federal law, and in turn, EPA
did not follow the law by imposing its own standards for the state’s
waterways when the noncompliance became apparent. The lower court
granted Environmental Groups’ motion to force EPA to adopt standards for
the state in compliance with federal law. EPA in turn sought a stay of the
order pending appeal. To successfully receive the stay, EPA needed to
show that: (1) a likelihood of success on appeal, (2) that EPA would be
irreparably harmed without the stay, (3) lack of the stay will irreparably
injure the interested parties and (4) the public interest favors a stay. EPA
failed to prove all four points, and so the court denied its stay pending
appeal.
W.D. Oklahoma
Sierra Club v. Chesapeake Operating, LLC, CIV-16-134-F, 2017 WL
1287546 (W.D. Okla. Apr. 4, 2017).
Environmental Organization sought to enjoin an oil and gas operator
(“Operator”) from activities regarding waste water injection relating to
seismicity. Organization alleged that Operator’s actions violated numerous
federal laws and increased the likelihood of earthquakes in the region. At
the same time, the state regulatory agency reviewed the same issues
regarding injection relating to seismicity. Operator moved to dismiss,
claiming that the district court should abstain from ruling on a matter to be
properly decided by the state regulatory agency. The court found that, as
Organization only sought equitable remedies, the state regulatory agency’s
review board constituted the proper avenue for Organization to seek relief.
Because the state regulatory agency already had ongoing review of this
issue, the court dismissed the case as redundant.
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State
California
Aptos Council v. City of Santa Cruz, 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 142 (Cal. Ct. App.
2017).
Community council (“Council”) challenged a County’s adoption of three
ordinances under the State Environmental Quality Act (“SEQA”), claiming
that County’s adoption resulted from an improper piecemeal review of
environmental impacts. Council claimed that County should have
considered the ordinances as a single project under the SEQA because
County’s goal was to reform and modernize zoning regulations. The
appellate court addressed the issue whether County’s passage of the three
ordinances constitute a single project under the SEQA, and whether County
violated SEQA by not considering environmental impact reports. County’s
ordinances authorized: (1) administrative approval of minor exceptions to
zoning site standards, (2) administrative approvals of sign exceptions with a
public notice and (3) denser hotel developments. The court found each
ordinance to be three separate projects. According to the court, SEQA
requires an environmental impact report for projects if their effects are
“reasonably foreseeable consequence.” Here, the court emphasized
“consequence” and found that although the ordinances shared the common
objective of modernizing zoning regulations, because the regulatory
reforms operated independently of each other and because County could
implement each regulation separately, there was no SEQA violation.
Assoc. of Irritated Residents v. Dep’t of Conservation, 218 Cal. Rptr. 3d
517 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
Interest groups (“Groups”) challenged the California Department of
Conservation, Division of Oil, Gas and Geothermal Resources (“DOGGR”)
after it issued permits to 214 new hydraulic fracturing oil wells in one
county. Groups claimed that the permitting of all wells was done without
any environmental review and in violation of the California Environmental
Quality Act (“CEQA”). DOGGR argued that the case was barred due to a
final judgment in a prior action in another county. Groups claimed that the
case was not barred because the prior action was dismissed due to the
enacting of a new law making the case moot. The appellate court held in
favor for Groups, finding that the CEQA applies, meaning this case is not
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moot. The court sent the case back down to trial court for further
proceedings.
Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City of Newport Beach, 392 P.3d 455 (Cal.
2017).
City approved the development of a large parcel of land and performed an
environmental impact report (“EIR”). Conservation Group took legal action
to set aside the approval of the development arguing the EIR was
inadequate and City did not work with the California Coastal Commission
(“Commission”) to identify wetlands and habitats affected by the
development. In California, the EIR must follow the guidelines of the
California Environmental Quality Act (“CEQA”), which requires an EIR
for areas which may qualify as environmentally sensitive habitat areas
under state law. The trial court found for Conservation Group because
environmentally sensitive habitats must be identified before approval of a
development project requiring Commission being consulted before the EIR
and before approval. The appellate court reversed. The California Supreme
Court then held that CEQA requires that an EIR must identify
environmentally sensitive areas, or areas that might be identified as such,
and City’s EIR is inadequate due to its lack of cooperation with
Commission to identify the correct areas.
Cal. Chamber of Commerce v. State Air Res. Bd., 216 Cal. Rptr. 3d 694
(Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
The California Chamber of Commerce (“Chamber”) brought suit against
the California State Air Resources Board (“Board”) over its implementing
regulation setting a “cap-and-trade” on the right to emit greenhouse gas
(“GHG”). The California legislature passed, by a simple majority, the
California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 (“Act”), which granted
Board regulatory authority over emissions. Board set up a program where
companies could purchase “compliance instruments” that would allow them
to emit certain GHGs. These emission allowances were sold at quarterly
auctions by Board. This stifled business operations, so Chamber sued,
seeking to invalidate this regulation. The first assertion was that Board’s
decision to sell these emission allowances at an auction exceeded the
authority granted to Board by California’s Legislature. The court disagreed
with this assertion, finding Board held ample authority to conduct the
auctions. The second assertion by Chamber was that the Act imposes a tax
on the companies having to purchase the emission allowances, and, as per
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the California constitution, the imposition of this tax requires a two-thirds
supermajority vote in the legislature. The court also disagreed with this
assertion as a tax is: (1) compulsory for the payee and (2) something for
which the payee receives nothing in return. Board’s auction is voluntary
and is a sale of something of value. For these reasons, Board’s regulation
was not found to be a tax and was upheld.
POET, LLC v. Cal. Air Res. Bd., 160 Cal. Rptr. 3d 681 (Cal. Ct. App.
2017).
State Air Quality Board (“Board”), in charge of the state plan to reduce
greenhouse gas emissions, sought to comply with an earlier court order
related to low carbon fuel standards (“Standards”). A Biofuel Company
challenged Board’s finding that certain emissions disqualified Biofuel
Company to receive state environmental credits, and that such emission
standards violated state law. The court previously ordered Board to correct
such standards. Board improperly used an antiquated baseline for the
emissions of greenhouse gasses related to biofuels which deprived the
public of vital information, in violation of state environmental law. To
facilitate Board to remedy its deficiencies, the court ordered that the
regulations remain frozen so that Board need not hit a moving target.
Finally, the court found that Board made a bad faith selection as to its
baseline standards for the biofuel emissions.
Sierra Club v. Cty. of Sonoma, 217 Cal. Rptr. 3d 327 (Cal. Ct. App. 2017).
Environmental
Group
challenged
the
City
Commissioner’s
(“Commissioner”) determination that the issuance of a permit for a
vineyard was a ministerial act, which exempted the decision from state
environmental law. County ordinance required vineyard operators to obtain
an erosion control permit from Commissioner prior to commencement of
operation. Operators, also a party in interest with Commissioner, submitted
their permit, and after several alternations to the plans, Commissioner
approved the permit. Later, Commissioner labeled the issuance as
ministerial and exempted from state law. The ministerial exemption only
covers decisions regarding projects that does not require Commissioner’s
discretion. A project lacks discretion if Commissioner would lack the
power to stop it regardless of further environmental review under the state
law. Environmental Group argued that the issuance of the permit always
requires Commissioner discretion and thus the ministerial exemption should
never apply. Environmental Group cited many state provisions that created
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discretion, but the court summarily rejected the application of these
provisions to this type of erosion control permit. Finally, Environmental
Group argued that because Commissioner may request additional actions be
taken, this stripped the decision of its ministerial label. The court found that
the ability to request additional information does not rise to the level as to
forgo the ministerial status, and therefore approved the permit. The court
limited its opinion only to Operator’s permit, and did not extend its decision
to any other permits to be issued.
Delaware
Clean Harbors, Inc. v. Union Pac. Corp., C.A. No. N15C-07-081 MMJ
CCLD, 2017 WL 1175664 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 28, 2017).
The dispute arose between a hazardous waste facility operator (“Operator”)
and the Operator’s Predecessor-in-Interest (“Predecessor”) regarding an
indemnity clause in a stock purchase agreement (“SPA”). Predecessor
agreed to indemnity Operator for certain environmental liabilities up to a
certain dollar amount, and for a certain period from the effective date of the
SPA. EPA and state environmental agency investigated contamination on
the facility property and required Operator to remediate the contamination
damages. Operator took necessary steps to clean up the contamination in a
timely manner and submitted claim for costs of remediation to Predecessor
pursuant to the SPA. The claim hinged on whether EPA and state agency
were third parties to the contamination claims, a necessary requirement to
trigger the indemnity. On summary judgment, the court found that EPA and
the state agency met the third-party requirement, but issues of fact still
existed regarding the extent of the remediation claim and the actual dollar
figure that Predecessor must indemnify. The court also found for
Predecessor and dismissed Operator’s claim for lost profits and excluded
Operator’s expert witness. This is an unpublished opinion of the court;
therefore, state court rules should be consulted before publication.
Louisiana
Borcik v. Crosby Tugs, L.L.C., 2016-1372 (La. 5/3/17), No. 2016-QC-1372,
2017 WL 1716226.
A federal circuit court certified a question to the Louisiana Supreme Court
to determine the definition of “good faith” in reference to a state
environmental quality statute. The law protects employees who identify or
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complain of an environmental violation, so long as the employee does so in
good faith and with the reasonable belief that the violation occurred. At trial
in the federal court system, a tug boat operator (“Employer”) fired
Employee after Employee claimed that his superiors ordered him to dump
waste oil into navigable waters. Employer claimed that the firing occurred
because of insubordination. The court found that a broader definition of
good faith more adequately captured the goals of the environmental
protection law, to encourage employees to identify environmental
violations. Therefore, the Louisiana Supreme Court adopted the definition
that “good faith” means that the employee acted with an honest belief that a
violation of a law occurred.
New Jersey
In re Final Surface Water Renewal Permit Action NJPDES Permit No.
NJ0102563, No. A-5803-13T1, 2017 WL 1550009 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. May 1, 2017).
Environmental Groups challenged the issuance of a permit to the Waste
Treatment Corporation (“Corporation”) on the claims that the permit
violates state environmental laws. Corporation sought the permit to
discharge treated waste water into a river. Environmental Groups allege that
the permit did not receive proper review and the prolonged procedure,
which stretched back close to a decade, should prohibit the issuance of a
permit. Corporation claims that its permit process complied with all the
applicable review procedures. A state law required that Corporation discuss
plans and receive approval from a regional commission on the permitted
plans. The court found that, although Corporation produced evidence of
telephonic communication between Corporation and the regional
commission, no proof existed of approval, or what was discussed.
Therefore, the court remanded the permit back to the administrative level.
This is an unpublished opinion of the court; therefore, state court rules
should be consulted before citing the case as precedent.
New York
In re Zahav Enters., Inc. v. Martens, 53 N.Y.S.3d 679 (N.Y. App. Div.
2017).
Landowner, owned and operated a gas station up until 2007, when it sold
the land to third party to be used as a pharmacy. Per state law, Landowner
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was responsible for environmental clean-up associated with the land and the
removal of the underground storage tanks. When the storage tanks were
removed petroleum contamination was found and reported to the New York
State Department of Conservation (“DEC”). After a year of back and forth
between DEC and Landowner on how to clean up the contamination, DEC
sent Landowner a final notice letter requiring it to have a plan for dealing
with the contamination by November 2010. Landowner did not respond or
submit a plan, so DEC moved for the regulatory commission
(“Commission”) to issue an order citing Landowner for three different
violations and fine Landowner $112,500. Commission ultimately cited
Landowner for the three violations, but decreased the fine to $60,000.
Landowner then commenced a proceeding against DEC for acting in bad
faith and one of its employees for violating state law. The appellate court
found that the Landowner’s contentions were without merit, that the
stipulation was valid.
Town of Marilla v. Travis, No. 151 A.D. 3d 1588 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017).
Town challenged the State Environmental Agency’s (“Agency”) decision to
grant a waste treatment storage facility to Facility Operator. Facility
Operator sought a permit to store treated waste water in containers to be
held until the waste water could be used as fertilizer. Agency appointed
itself as the proper review agency after Town failed to create a review
process. The court found that Town improperly argued that Agency did not
follow proper procedure. Agency properly reviewed scientific and
engineering data in compliance with all statutes to make its permit decision.
Facility Operator complied with each Agency request for additional
information or tests. Under state law, if the court finds that Agency properly
followed all relevant procedure, then the court will not substitute its
decisions for that of the Agency. Because Agency followed procedural and
the permit grant did not violate the clear evidence, Agency properly granted
the storage permit.
North Carolina
WASCO LLC v. N.C. Dep’t of Env’t & Nat. Res., 799 S.E.2d 405 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2017).
This dispute involved a cleanup site (“Site”) that various parties once used
to operate a textile business. Beneath the Site were storage tanks containing
hazardous dry-cleaning solvents, which had leaked. Pursuant to the federal
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Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) and state Hazardous
Waste Program (“HWP”), agencies sought to hold entities responsible for
cleanup of the Site. Meanwhile, former manufacturer (“Company”)
provided financial assurances to the state Division of Waste Management
(“DWM”) and was actively involved in the Site’s post-closure
environmental issues. After DWM declared that Company was liable as an
“operator” of the Site, Company sought a declaration from an ALJ that it
was not an operator under relevant laws. The ALJ disagreed and granted
summary judgment for DWM. Company sought review in the trial court,
which affirmed the ALJ’s ruling. The court concluded that Company was
“an operator of a landfill” for purposes of HWP. Company appealed to the
court of appeals, which affirmed the trial court’s order. The court held that
the trial court properly sought guidance from federal law—including the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act—in assessing whether Company was an operator under HWP.
Moreover, the court held that HWP’s definition “includes those parties in
charge of directing post-closure activities” under RCRA. Finally, the court
concluded that the facts on which the trial court relied insisted that
Company was a party in charge of such post-closure activities.
Pennsylvania
Nat’l Fuel Gas Midstream Corp. v. Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Prot., No. 116 C.D.
2016, 2017 WL 2391719 (Pa. Commw. Ct. June 2, 2017).
This case addressed whether a state Department of Environmental
Protection (“DEP”) may, for air pollution control purposes, aggregate two
facilities owned by separate entities that ultimately derive from a common
company when one of the entities is exempt from permitting requirements.
A well-pad operator (“WPO”) and compressor-station operator (“CSO”)
were wholly-owned subsidiaries of Parent Company; WPO was exempt
from the permitting requirements at issue. The permitting requirements
stemmed from the federal Clean Air Act and state Air Pollution Control
Act. Under those statutes, DEP may aggregate two related natural gas
operations into a single source for permitting purposes; various standards
bear on whether two facilities amount to a single source. This case focused
on the third prong of DEP’s three-part test: whether the facilities are “under
common control.” Although DEP and the Environmental Hearing Board
(“EHB”) construed “common control” in different ways, both concluded
that WPO and CSO were a single source for permitting purposes. WPO and
CSO raised three arguments on appeal: (1) that EHB misconstrued the
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common-control test; (2) that EHB could not impose obligations on WPO
as an exempt party; and (3) that EHB’s conclusion that WPO and CSO fell
within the “common sense notion of a plant” was arbitrary and capricious.
First, the court held that EHB’s “power to influence” standard for common
control was too lax; in the court’s view, the proper test was “ability to
direct.” Second, the court held that to aggregate an exempt facility, DEP
must show either the Parent Company’s direct involvement in operations or
pierce the corporate veil. And finally, the court remanded the “notion of a
plant” issue in view of the fact that EHB applied the wrong standard for
“common control.”
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